State v. Beitel
895 N.W.2d 710
Neb.2017Background
- Roger and his father Allen were charged with conspiracy to commit felony theft; Allen’s information filed July 1, 2015, Roger’s July 15, 2015.
- Allen waived speedy trial at an October hearing and his trial was continued; the court later granted the State’s motion to join the cases for a joint trial.
- At a January 5, 2016 pretrial conference the court set the joint trial to begin February 1, 2016 and Roger’s counsel objected that February exceeded Roger’s January 24 speedy-trial deadline. The court told counsel to file motions to sever or discharge if desired.
- Roger filed no severance motion before his deadline expired; on January 27 he moved for absolute discharge (speedy-trial violation). An evidentiary hearing was held January 28.
- The district court found the three statutory elements of the codefendant exclusion (joined with a codefendant whose time had not run; reasonable delay; good cause for not granting severance) were met and denied Roger’s motion. Roger appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Beitel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 29-1207(4)(e) creates a unitary speedy-trial clock for joined codefendants | Argues joint defendants share the latest remaining time so exclusion applies broadly | Argues speedy-trial right is personal; joining to a codefendant shouldn’t extend Roger’s clock | Court rejects a unitary-clock rule; speedy-trial right is personal and measured per defendant under § 29-1207(4)(e) |
| Whether defendant must file a pre-deadline motion to sever to preserve speedy-trial rights | Implies waiver where no pre-deadline severance motion was filed | Contends court erred in treating failure to move to sever as waiver of speedy-trial right | Court: failure to move before deadline forecloses statutory remedy of severance but does not waive the personal speedy-trial right; defendant may move for discharge after deadline |
| How to measure the excluded period under § 29-1207(4)(e) when trial is set for a date certain | State uses latest codefendant’s calculation (longer) | Roger argues the shorter, his own calculation should control | Court measures from the moving defendant’s expiration (Roger’s) and then counts days from that date to the joint trial start; here an 8-day exclusion was reasonable |
| Whether the State proved reasonableness of delay and good cause for not granting severance | Argues 8-day delay was reasonable and severance lacked good cause given trial logistics and timing | Argues earlier trial dates were available and good cause for severance existed | Court found no clear error: 8-day delay reasonable given scheduling and jury concerns; evidence supported good cause for denying severance |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (statutory construction principles)
- State v. Covey, 290 Neb. 257 (statutory interpretation review)
- State v. Knudtson, 262 Neb. 917 (burden on State to prove excluded periods)
- State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281 (speedy-trial act history)
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (federal Speedy Trial Act interpretation contrasted)