428 P.3d 343
Wash.2018Background
- At 16, Brian Bassett was convicted of three counts of aggravated first-degree murder and originally received three consecutive life-without-parole (LWOP) terms under the then-mandatory 1996 statute.
- After Miller v. Alabama, Washington enacted a "Miller-fix" (RCW 10.95.030) requiring sentencing courts to consider youth-related mitigating factors before imposing LWOP for 16- and 17-year-olds and to resentence those previously given mandatory LWOP.
- Bassett was resentenced in 2015 under the Miller-fix; he presented extensive mitigation and evidence of rehabilitation, but the trial court again imposed consecutive LWOP terms.
- On appeal Bassett argued juvenile LWOP is categorically cruel under article I, §14 of the Washington Constitution; the Court of Appeals adopted a categorical analysis and held juvenile LWOP unconstitutional.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review on the State's petition and affirmed: it held article I, §14 affords greater protection than the Eighth Amendment in this context, adopted the categorical-bar framework (instead of exclusively applying State v. Fain), and ruled juvenile LWOP unconstitutional under the state constitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| I. Is WA Const. art. I, §14 more protective than the Eighth Amendment? | Bassett: yes; state provision affords greater protection for cruel punishment. | State: follow federal Eighth Amendment; Gunwall required before expanding state protection. | Yes; Gunwall factors weigh toward greater protection for juvenile sentencing. |
| II. Which analytical framework applies: categorical bar or Fain proportionality? | Bassett/Ct. of Appeals: use categorical-bar (considers offender class characteristics). | State: retain Fain proportionality (traditional WA test). | Adopt categorical-bar for this categorical juvenile challenge; Fain remains for other claims. |
| III. Under categorical analysis, is juvenile LWOP cruel punishment? | Bassett: LWOP for juveniles is categorically cruel given developmental differences and national trend away from juvenile LWOP. | State: legislature may allow LWOP for 16–17-year-olds; Miller-fix provides required individualized consideration. | Yes; national consensus and youth characteristics mean juvenile LWOP violates art. I, §14. |
| IV. Even under Fain, is juvenile LWOP constitutional? | Bassett: Fain factors still produce unconstitutionality because punishment is disproportionate for juveniles. | State: Fain supports legislature's judgment and sentencing discretion. | Even applying Fain, LWOP for juveniles is disproportionate and unconstitutional under art. I, §14. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile LWOP unconstitutional; sentencers must consider youth and attendant characteristics)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorically forbids juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenses; frames categorical analysis)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (capital punishment unconstitutional for offenders under 18; foundational discussion of youth characteristics)
- State v. Fain, 94 Wash.2d 387 (1980) (Washington's traditional proportionality test for cruel-punishment challenges)
- State v. Ramos, 187 Wash.2d 420 (2017) (applies Miller principles in Washington; explains interplay of federal Miller and state review)