State v. Barryngton Eugene Searcy
Background
- In 1988 Barryngton E. Searcy was convicted by jury of first-degree murder and robbery; received a determinate life without parole for murder, a consecutive indeterminate life (with a ten-year determinate component) for robbery, and a ten-year firearm enhancement.
- Searcy pursued three prior appeals (1990, 1991, 1993) challenging aspects of conviction and sentencing; the courts affirmed convictions and modified certain enhancements and sentencing mechanics on remand.
- In 2016 Searcy filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, a motion for court-appointed counsel, and an I.C.R. 36 motion to correct a name spelling; the district court granted Rule 36 but denied Rule 35 relief and denied appointed counsel.
- The district court held Searcy’s claims attacked the underlying conviction or required factual development, were therefore beyond the narrow scope of Rule 35, and were barred by res judicata where appropriate.
- The court also concluded Searcy met indigency but that his Rule 35 motion was frivolous or not one a reasonable person would pay to pursue, so denial of court-appointed counsel was not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Searcy's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentence is illegal under I.C.R. 35 | Searcy contended conviction and sentences are unlawful and should be vacated | Rule 35 is narrow; Searcy attacks convictions/facts, not a sentence unauthorized by law | Denied — claims are collateral attacks on the conviction and beyond Rule 35 scope |
| Whether claims are barred by res judicata | Argued district court erred invoking res judicata to refuse merits review | Prior appeals resolved these matters or they should have been raised earlier; res judicata bars re-litigation | Denied — res judicata applies to issues raised or that should have been raised earlier |
| Whether factual issues may be resolved on Rule 35 | Searcy sought factual review of jury instructions, sequencing of offenses, aggravators, and procedural sentencing defects | Rule 35 is limited to legal questions and sentences unauthorized by law; not for factual determinations | Denied — resolution would require factual inquiry, not permissible under Rule 35 |
| Whether court-appointed counsel should have been provided | Requested appointed counsel to develop claims | Although indigent, his motion was frivolous/non-cognizable under Rule 35; district court may deny counsel for frivolous Rule 35 proceedings | Denied — district court did not abuse discretion in refusing appointment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286 (Ct. App.) (Rule 35 illegal-sentence review is a question of law)
- State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895 (Ct. App.) (Rule 35 appellate review is legal question)
- State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82 (Idaho 2009) (Rule 35 is narrow; addresses sentences not authorized by law)
- State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55 (Idaho 2015) (Rule 35 cannot require significant factual determinations)
- Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1962) (distinguishing collateral attack from direct appeal principles)
- Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885 (Ct. App.) (collateral attack limitations)
- Gubler By and Through Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107 (Idaho) (res judicata bars relitigation of finally decided causes)
- Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598 (Ct. App.) (standards for appointing counsel in post-conviction proceedings)
- Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491 (Ct. App.) (patently frivolous petitions need not be developed by counsel)
- State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App.) (district court may deny appointed counsel where proceeding is frivolous)