State v. Baroz
2017 NMSC 30
| N.M. | 2017Background
- On August 30, 2011, Benjamin David Baroz III ("Baroz") rode in the passenger seat of his father’s truck; shots were fired from the passenger-side window into a backyard, killing Matthew Cordova.
- The State prosecuted Baroz for first-degree felony murder (predicated on shooting at or from a motor vehicle), two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of drug paraphernalia; jury convicted on those counts.
- The predicate conviction for shooting at or from a motor vehicle was later vacated on double jeopardy grounds at trial; Baroz appealed multiple rulings.
- Baroz argued on appeal that: shooting at/from a motor vehicle cannot be a felony-murder predicate; evidence was insufficient for murder; he was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction; one-year firearm sentencing enhancements violated double jeopardy; and statements made after invoking Miranda should not have been used to impeach him.
- The Court vacated the felony-murder conviction and directed entry of second-degree murder, and affirmed the denial of a self-defense instruction, the firearm-enhancement sentence, and admission of post-invocation statements for impeachment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Baroz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether shooting at or from a motor vehicle can be a predicate felony for felony murder | Predicate felony valid to elevate to felony murder | Shooting at/from a vehicle is an elevated form of aggravated battery and cannot serve as a felony-murder predicate | Court: Cannot serve as predicate; vacated felony-murder and entered second-degree murder |
| Sufficiency of evidence for second-degree murder | Evidence (muzzle flash from passenger side, victim killed by gunshot) supports that Baroz shot and knew his actions created strong probability of death | Actual shooter could have been father; Baroz lacked requisite mens rea | Court: Evidence sufficient for second-degree murder (or felony murder mens rea) |
| Whether denial of self-defense instruction was error | No self-defense instruction required because objective reasonableness lacking | Baroz provoked confrontation and reasonably feared imminent deadly force due to gestures; instruction warranted | Court: Denial was proper — objective element lacking; instruction not required |
| Whether one-year firearm enhancement for aggravated assault violates double jeopardy | Enhancement is authorized by statute and reflects distinct legislative intent to punish firearm use more severely | Enhancement duplicates punishment because firearm is element of aggravated assault | Court: Enhancement does not violate double jeopardy; Legislature authorized cumulative punishment |
| Admissibility of statements made after Baroz invoked right to remain silent (for impeachment) | Post-invocation statements were voluntary and therefore admissible to impeach under Harris/Harris principle | Statements were involuntary because detectives implied promises of leniency and persisted after invocation | Court: Statements were voluntary under totality of circumstances; admissible for impeachment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Marquez, 376 P.3d 815 (N.M. 2016) (holding shooting at or from a motor vehicle is an elevated form of aggravated battery and cannot serve as a felony-murder predicate)
- State v. Meadors, 908 P.2d 731 (N.M. 1995) (lesser-included offense doctrine and entry of lesser conviction on appeal)
- State v. Flores, 226 P.3d 641 (N.M. 2010) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266 (N.M. 1996) (mens rea needed for felony-murder derives from second-degree murder requirement)
- State v. Gaines, 36 P.3d 438 (N.M. 2001) (self-defense instruction required when sufficient evidence raises reasonable doubt)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation and right warnings)
- Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (U.S. 1971) (statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach if voluntary)
- Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1978) (totality of circumstances in voluntariness analysis)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (same-elements test for multiple punishments)
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1983) (legislative authorization allows cumulative punishment under distinct statutes)