State v. Barnes, 2022 Ohio 4486

Background:

A Cleveland gas-station shootout left one victim dead; surveillance cameras recorded persons firing but did not clearly show who fired the fatal shot.
Barnes was indicted for multiple felonies including murder; he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter in a plea deal that dismissed other counts and firearm specifications.
Some surveillance footage was produced to defense counsel as “counsel only” under Crim.R. 16(C); Barnes later obtained access to a version with audio the night before sentencing.
Barnes filed a timely presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing the audio would have changed his decision because it corroborated his self-defense claim; the trial court denied the motion and imposed five years of community control.
The Eighth District affirmed; the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that discovery of previously withheld evidence that would have changed a defendant’s decision to plead guilty can provide a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw a plea pre-sentencing, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Barnes)	Held
Whether learning of evidence previously withheld by defense counsel that would have changed the decision to plead guilty gives a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw a presentence plea	Denied—permitting withdrawal would prejudice the state; the withheld audio is not material enough to compel withdrawal	Yes—because the audio corroborates Barnes’s self-defense theory and he would not have pleaded guilty had he heard it	Yes—the Court held that discovery of such evidence can constitute a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw a plea pre-sentencing; trial court’s denial was an abuse of discretion; conviction vacated and remanded.
Proper framework/standard for evaluating presentence plea-withdrawal motions (Xie liberal standard vs. multi‑factor tests used by appellate courts)	Urged deference to the trial court and existing multifactor tests (Peterseim/Fish/Heisa) as tools to assess abuse of discretion	Argued Xie’s command that presentence motions be "freely and liberally granted" controls; trial courts should focus on whether defendant had a reasonable and legitimate basis rather than rigid factor-weighing	The Court reaffirmed Xie’s presumption in favor of freely and liberally granting presentence withdrawals and rejected rigid reliance on the multi-factor test; encouraged application of Xie’s standard and discretion focused on reasonable and legitimate bases.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion on the record (timeliness, counsel competence, Crim.R. 11 colloquy, and materiality of the audio)	Trial court’s denial was reasonable given its thorough hearings and concern for state prejudice; audio’s materiality is questionable	Trial court abused discretion because Barnes timely moved and the newly discovered audio was potentially dispositive to his self-defense claim; he reasonably relied on counsel and would not have pled guilty	Court found trial court abused discretion here: Barnes timely filed, reasonably relied on evidence he had not seen, and discovery of potentially outcome-changing evidence warranted withdrawal; conviction vacated and remanded.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 (1992) (presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be "freely and liberally granted"; trial court must find a "reasonable and legitimate basis")
State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211 (1980) (articulated multi‑factor approach used by many appellate courts for plea‑withdrawal reviews)
State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473 (1981) (Crim.R.11 colloquy protects constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea)
State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281 (1986) (elements of self‑defense in Ohio)
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (standard for appellate reversal of discretionary trial-court decisions)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (defendant generally makes core decisions—plea, waiver of jury, etc.)
Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (commentary on the primacy of the accused’s decisionmaking in criminal defense)