State v. Barker (Slip Opinion), 149 Ohio St. 3d 1

15-year-old Tyshawn Barker was custodially interrogated by Cincinnati detectives about two homicides; the interrogation was electronically recorded and Barker signed a police "Notification of Rights" form.
Barker made incriminating statements during the interrogation and later pled no contest to multiple charges; he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 25 years to life.
At a suppression hearing Barker argued he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The First District affirmed, referencing R.C. 2933.81(B), which creates a statutory presumption that statements recorded during custodial interrogation in a place of detention are voluntary, and treated the recording as supporting voluntariness.
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to decide (1) whether R.C. 2933.81(B) affects the State’s burden to prove a valid Miranda waiver and (2) whether the statute, as applied to juveniles, violates due process by shifting the burden of proving voluntariness.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Barker)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether R.C. 2933.81(B)’s presumption of voluntariness alters who bears the burden to prove a valid Miranda waiver	R.C. 2933.81(B) does not affect Miranda; the State still must prove waiver knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily	The statute allows a presumption of voluntariness for recorded statements and was argued to impose a burden on Barker to rebut voluntariness	Court: R.C. 2933.81(B) does not affect the Fifth Amendment waiver analysis; the State retains the burden to prove a valid Miranda waiver
Whether R.C. 2933.81(B), as applied to juveniles, violates due process by shifting burden to the juvenile to prove involuntariness	The presumption unconstitutionally shifts the State’s burden to juveniles and removes required totality-of-the-circumstances review for voluntariness	State argued Barker forfeited this as-applied challenge and that the issue was not appropriately before the court	Court: As applied to juveniles, R.C. 2933.81(B) is unconstitutional—due process requires the State to prove voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances; the statute impermissibly shifts the burden

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes procedural safeguards and State’s burden to prove valid waiver)
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (Congress may not overrule Miranda; recording does not substitute for waiver protections)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (voluntariness inquiry and need for state to prove confession voluntary)
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (State must prove voluntariness by preponderance)
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (totality-of-the-circumstances applies to juvenile Miranda waivers)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (special protections for juveniles; admissions by children require greatest care)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (totality-of-the-circumstances test for voluntariness)
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (no presumptions for waiver; waiver must be intelligent and understanding)