State v. Barfield
2017 Ohio 8243
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant Willie Barfield pleaded guilty to having a weapon while under a disability (R.C. 2923.13(A)(2)), admitting two juvenile adjudications for offenses that would have been robbery/aggravated robbery if he had been an adult.
- Trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Barfield to 12 months' imprisonment.
- Six days before Barfield’s plea, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Hand, which limited the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal sentences.
- Barfield filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing Hand barred use of his juvenile adjudications to establish the disability element and therefore his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
- The trial court denied the motion; Barfield appealed claiming Hand required reversal.
- The First District affirmed, concluding Hand did not bar using juvenile adjudications as the disability element in R.C. 2923.13 and that federal precedent (Lewis) permits less-than-valid convictions or adjudications to create firearm disabilities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hand bars using juvenile adjudications to prove the disability element of R.C. 2923.13 | State: Hand is limited to preventing juvenile adjudications from being treated as adult convictions to enhance sentence/degree | Barfield: Hand’s reasoning on unreliability of juvenile adjudications precludes their use to establish a disability element, making his plea involuntary | Held: Hand does not bar use here; Lewis controls and permits less-than-full convictions/ adjudications to establish a firearm disability |
| Whether Hand requires greater protection under Ohio’s due-course clause than federal due process | State: Ohio’s due-course clause does not afford broader protection than federal due process here | Barfield: Ohio constitution can provide more protection, so Hand should be read broadly | Held: Ohio’s due-course clause offers no greater protection for this issue; Hand interpreted to not extend beyond its sentence-enhancement holding |
| Whether Lewis v. United States permits use of constitutionally infirm convictions/adjudications as a disability element post-Apprendi | State: Lewis allows focusing on the mere fact of conviction/indictment or other disabilities, regardless of procedural safeguards | Barfield: Lewis is inapplicable because it involved adult convictions, not juvenile adjudications | Held: Lewis applies equally to juvenile adjudications; reliability is irrelevant to creating a firearm disability |
| Whether trial court abused its discretion in denying post-sentence plea-withdrawal under Crim.R. 32.1 (manifest injustice) | State: No manifest injustice because Hand does not invalidate the disability element and plea remained voluntary | Barfield: Plea was involuntary due to Hand’s effect on admissibility of adjudications | Held: No abuse of discretion; Barfield failed to show manifest injustice; plea denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (federal gun statutes may bar possession based on mere fact of conviction or indictment; reliability not required)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94 (2016) (juvenile adjudication cannot be treated as prior adult conviction to enhance degree or sentence)
- United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (prior-conviction exception to Apprendi should be limited to prior convictions obtained with jury trial)
- United States v. Marks, 379 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2004) (applies Lewis post-Apprendi to permit constitutionally infirm convictions to support firearm disability)