State v. Bannon, 112212

WSU officers received a complaint that a resident named "John" (later identified as John W. Bannon) routinely carried firearms and possibly worked for Homeland Security; dispatch identified Bannon as living in Room 414 and a resident assistant said he might be in the lobby.
Officers entered the locked Wheatshocker Apartments lobby using WSU IDs, saw Bannon matching the description, asked his name and whether he had weapons; Bannon said "No."
Officer Shelite had Bannon stand, placed Bannon's hands on his head, and performed a quick exterior patdown, recovering a Sig Sauer P229 from Bannon's waistband.
Bannon moved to suppress the gun, arguing the lobby was within the curtilage of his abode and that the Terry frisk did not apply (or lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous); he also argued lack of probable cause for arrest and that possession was within abode/curtilage.
The district court denied suppression and Bannon was convicted of criminal carrying of a concealed firearm; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding officers failed to show they were subjectively concerned for safety before the patdown.
The Kansas Supreme Court granted review, concluded the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal test for Terry frisks (treated lack of officer testimony about subjective fear as dispositive), reversed that panel decision, and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the patdown was justified under Terry's second prong (officer safety/frisk)	State: officers had reasonable suspicion Bannon was armed and could be frisked for safety; information from dispatch and witness (Wasserstein) was reliable	Bannon: officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous; no subjective fear shown and lobby was curtilage	Court: second-prong inquiry is objective—whether a reasonable officer would suspect the person was armed and dangerous; subjective testimony can be a factor but is not dispositive; remand for re-evaluation under correct test
Whether the lobby was within the curtilage of Bannon's abode (impacting expectation of privacy and suppression)	State: lobby is not part of defendant's abode/curtilage; no reasonable expectation of privacy in posted no-guns lobby	Bannon: common areas of locked apartment building are in curtilage and protected from warrantless search absent exigency	Court: Court of Appeals did not decide curtilage; on remand the panel must reconsider suppression under correct Terry standard and, if necessary, address curtilage/dismissal issue

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk test: reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that person is armed and presently dangerous)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (applies Terry standard; frisk requires reasonable suspicion detainee is armed and dangerous)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (subjective officer motivations generally irrelevant to constitutional reasonableness)
United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1989) (held officer must have actual subjective concern in addition to objective reasonableness)
United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2011) (questions continued validity of Lott’s subjective requirement)
State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003) (treats officer’s subjective belief as one factor within the objective totality-of-circumstances analysis)
State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727 (1998) (discusses totality-of-circumstances and deference to law enforcement experience in reasonableness analysis)