State v. Aultman
2017 Ohio 758
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In July 2013 William E. Aultman pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under 13; the State agreed to dismiss a third-victim charge and to review a presentence investigation report.
- At sentencing the court classified Aultman as a Tier II sex offender, questioned him about his failure to seek counseling, considered the PSI and victim statements, and imposed consecutive five-year terms (total 10 years), plus fines and costs.
- Aultman did not file a direct appeal. Nearly three years later (May 13, 2016) he filed a petition for postconviction relief conceding guilt but arguing due process was violated by the court’s sentencing questions (which, he said, required professional testimony) and that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting.
- The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), finding no applicable exception under R.C. 2953.23(A).
- On appeal Aultman argued the filing should be treated under Crim.R. 32.1 (post‑sentence plea withdrawal) to avoid the statutory time bar; the appellate court declined, treating the filing as a postconviction petition and affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Crim.R. 32.1 can be used to avoid R.C. 2953.21 timeliness for this filing | N/A (State sought dismissal) | Aultman argued the petition should be treated as a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw plea so no statutory time limit applies | The court held Crim.R. 32.1 and postconviction relief are distinct; Aultman filed a petition under R.C. 2953.21, not a Crim.R. 32.1 motion, so Crim.R. 32.1 does not apply |
| Whether the untimely postconviction petition falls within R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) (unavoidably prevented or new retroactive right) | N/A | Aultman argued his status as a convicted sex offender prevented him from obtaining psychological evidence and thus he was "unavoidably prevented" from discovering supporting facts; alternatively relied on due process/IAC claims | The court held Aultman was aware of the facts and counsel’s failure at sentencing; he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering them and cited no new retroactive Supreme Court right, so the exception does not apply |
| Whether R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) permits an untimely challenge to sentence by a noncapital petitioner | N/A | Aultman sought relief as to his sentence based on due process/IAC at sentencing | The court held (consistent with precedent) that §2953.23(A)(1)(b) does not extend to noncapital sentencing claims, so it cannot save the untimely petition |
| Whether R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) (postconviction DNA testing exception) applies | N/A | Aultman did not claim innocence via DNA; sought only sentencing relief | The court held the DNA-testing exception was inapplicable because no DNA testing or innocence claim was asserted |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (Ohio 1977) (post‑sentence plea withdrawal recognized under Crim.R. 32.1)
- State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235 (Ohio 2002) (plea withdrawal motions and petitions for postconviction relief are distinct remedies)
- State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (Ohio 1999) (postsentence Crim.R. 32.1 motions are not collateral challenges under R.C. 2953.21)
- State v. Monroe, 29 N.E.3d 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (postconviction relief allows review of constitutional issues not apparent from the trial record)