State v. Ashley Beth Gammill, 442 S.W.3d 538

At ~11:30 p.m. an officer observed Ashley Gammill driving on the Dallas North Tollway without headlights, stopped her, observed signs of intoxication, performed field sobriety tests, and arrested her for DWI.
Gammill moved to suppress, arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion because Tex. Transp. Code § 547.302 requires headlights only when it is both nighttime AND visibility is less than 1,000 feet (conjunctive reading).
The officer did not testify about whether a person or vehicle was discernible at 1,000 feet; he only testified it was nighttime and the car had no headlights.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress based on a conjunctive interpretation of the statute.
The State appealed, arguing § 547.302 is properly read disjunctively (nighttime OR insufficient light/poor visibility) and the stop was therefore reasonable.
The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory construction de novo and suppression rulings under the usual bifurcated standard and reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tex. Transp. Code § 547.302 requires headlights only when BOTH nighttime and <1,000-ft visibility exist (conjunctive)	Section uses “and”; thus lights required only when both nighttime and reduced visibility coexist	Section should be read disjunctively: lights required at nighttime OR when visibility is less than 1,000 feet	The statute is construed disjunctively; duty to display lights applies at nighttime or when visibility is insufficient, so the stop was reasonable
Whether the stop had reasonable suspicion for a traffic violation	No reasonable suspicion because record lacks evidence of <1,000-ft visibility	Officer observed driving at night without headlights—sufficient under § 547.302 as construed	Officer’s observation that vehicle lacked headlights at night gave reasonable suspicion; suppression was erroneous

Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (burden-shifting framework for suppression motions)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (officer may stop and detain for reasonable suspicion)
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (definition of reasonable suspicion: specific articulable facts)
Boston v. State, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (statutory construction principles; apply plain meaning)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (apply plain meaning when statute unambiguous)
Bayou Pipeline Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n, 568 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. 1978) ("and" may be read as "or" to effectuate legislative intent)
State v. Carmaco, 203 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (construing "and" as "or" to avoid absurd result)
Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (driving without headlights at night violates lighting statutes)
Ruffin v. State, 134 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1939) (limit on interpreting "or" as "and" in penal statutes when it increases punishment)