State v. Amaya, 298 Neb. 70

Background

In 1999 Jay D. Amaya pled no contest to first‑degree murder, use of a knife in a felony, and sexual assault; he did not file a direct appeal.
Amaya filed a postconviction motion in 2006 raising ineffective‑assistance claims; after an evidentiary hearing the district court denied relief and this court affirmed in 2008.
On September 2, 2016, Amaya filed a successive verified motion for postconviction relief alleging additional ineffective assistance claims and seeking a new trial; he acknowledged Nebraska’s 1‑year statute of limitations for postconviction motions.
The district court dismissed the successive motion on September 7, 2016, without an evidentiary hearing or requiring a State response, concluding the motion was time barred, re‑litigation or previously available, and frivolous; it implicitly denied the new‑trial request and dismissed with prejudice.
Amaya filed a motion to amend (denied as filed after dismissal) and a motion to alter or amend the judgment (denied as untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25‑1329); he appealed pro se.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court could dismiss a postconviction motion sua sponte as time barred	Amaya did not dispute dismissal authority but argued timeliness tolling/ex post facto problems	State (and court) contends court may sua sponte decide timeliness during preliminary review and that motion is time barred	Court: trial court may, but is not required to, consider timeliness sua sponte; dismissal was proper because motion was time barred
Whether applying the 1‑year limitation enacted in 2011 to crimes committed earlier is an ex post facto punishment	Amaya argued retroactive application of § 29‑3001(4) is an ex post facto law	State argued § 29‑3001(4) is a statute of limitations, not punitive, and not ex post facto	Court: statutory time limit is not ex post facto and may be applied
Whether § 29‑3001(4)(c) tolls the limitations period because of state‑created impediment (alleged ineffective prior postconviction counsel)	Amaya argued prior postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness created an impediment preventing timely filing	State argued alleged impediment is not state action creating a constitutional or statutory violation and ineffective postconviction counsel is not a constitutional right	Court: tolling not available; ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings is not a constitutional basis to toll; Amaya did not show state‑created impediment
Whether the district court erred in denying leave to amend and denying motion to alter or amend	Amaya argued he should have been allowed to amend under pleading rules and Mata	State argued postconviction proceedings aren’t governed by civil pleading rules for amendments and Amaya’s motion was untimely	Court: no error—postconviction rules do not permit amendment after court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing; motion to alter was untimely under § 25‑1329

Key Cases Cited

State v. Amaya, 276 Neb. 818 (affirming denial of Amaya’s earlier postconviction relief)
State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (discussing § 29‑3001(4) as statute of limitations and waiver when State fails to raise it)
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (U.S. Supreme Court permitting sua sponte timeliness review of habeas petitions)
State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29 (holding postconviction proceedings are not governed by civil pleading rules to permit amendment after court finds no hearing necessary)
State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288 (confirming § 29‑3001(4) applies to successive postconviction motions)
State v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of postconviction pleadings)