State v. Amaya
298 Neb. 70
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Jay D. Amaya pled no contest in 1999 to first-degree murder, use of a knife in a felony, and sexual assault; no direct appeal was filed.
- Amaya filed a first postconviction motion in 2006 raising ineffective-assistance claims; it was litigated with an evidentiary hearing and denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
- In September 2016 Amaya filed a successive, verified postconviction motion asserting additional ineffective-assistance claims and a motion for new trial.
- The district court dismissed the successive motion with prejudice without an evidentiary hearing, concluding it was time barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4), raised claims previously available or litigated, and was frivolous.
- Amaya sought leave to amend the successive motion and filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; both requests were denied (the amendment request as untimely after dismissal; the motion to alter or amend as untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1329).
- Amaya appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the successive motion was properly dismissed as time barred and that the court may sua sponte dismiss a facially time-barred postconviction motion during preliminary review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Amaya) | Defendant's Argument (State / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / sua sponte dismissal | The 1-year limit shouldn’t be applied or court should not dismiss sua sponte | Court may consider timeliness during preliminary review; motion was facially time barred | Court held a trial court may sua sponte dismiss a postconviction motion that on its face (or with files/records) is time barred, and Amaya’s motion was time barred |
| Ex post facto challenge to § 29-3001(4) | Applying the 2011 one-year limit to crimes committed earlier is ex post facto punishment | Statutory filing limitations are not among ex post facto prohibitions | Court held § 29-3001(4) does not create ex post facto punishment; challenge rejected |
| Tolling based on state-created impediment (§ 29-3001(4)(c)) | First postconviction counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness prevented filing within one year; tolling should apply | Ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings is not a constitutional violation created by state action for tolling; no facts showing prevention of filing | Court held Amaya failed to satisfy (1) state-created impediment, (2) constitutional/state-law violation, and (3) prevention of filing; tolling not available |
| Amendment and motion to alter judgment | Should be allowed to amend and to timely alter judgment | Postconviction statutes don’t permit amendment after court finds no need for evidentiary hearing; motion to alter was untimely under § 25-1329 | Court held amendment denied properly (Robertson precedent) and motion to alter was untimely; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (federal courts may sua sponte consider timeliness of habeas petitions during preliminary review)
- State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (2015) (§ 29-3001(4) is a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional)
- State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29 (2016) (postconviction statutes do not contemplate amendment of a motion after court finds no evidentiary hearing necessary)
- State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288 (2016) (application of § 29-3001(4) to successive postconviction motions)
- State v. Hessler, 288 Neb. 670 (2014) (standards for successive postconviction proceedings)
- State v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118 (2015) (pleading sufficiency standard in postconviction review)