State v. Amaya
298 Neb. 70
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jay D. Amaya pled no contest to first‑degree murder, use of a knife in commission of a felony, and sexual assault; he did not file a direct appeal.
- Amaya filed a postconviction motion in 2006 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; after an evidentiary hearing the district court denied relief and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
- On September 2, 2016 Amaya filed a successive verified postconviction motion claiming additional ineffective assistance (trial counsel failed to disclose evidence and misadvised about exposure to the death penalty) and included a motion for a new trial.
- The district court dismissed the successive motion on September 7, 2016 as time barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑3001(4), as raising claims litigated or available earlier, and as frivolous; the court dismissed without requesting a State response or holding an evidentiary hearing.
- Amaya filed a motion to amend (denied as filed after dismissal) and a motion to alter or amend (found untimely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25‑1329); he appealed, arguing the court erred by dismissing without notice/hearing, denying amendment and relief, and denying appointment of counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court may sua sponte dismiss a postconviction motion as time barred | Amaya argued court should not dismiss without notice/hearing and State response | State (and court) asserted preliminary review statute authorizes court to dismiss if records show no relief | Court: trial court may, but is not required to, consider timeliness sua sponte during preliminary review and dismiss if motion and records show time bar |
| Whether § 29‑3001(4) one‑year limitation applies retroactively (ex post facto) | Amaya argued applying 2011 statute to his 1999 conviction is ex post facto punishment | State argued statute is procedural statute of limitation, not ex post facto | Court: statute of limitations does not constitute ex post facto punishment; § 29‑3001(4) applies |
| Whether alleged ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel tolls under § 29‑3001(4)(c) | Amaya claimed prior postconviction counsel’s failings were a state‑created impediment preventing timely filing | State argued ineffective postconviction counsel is not state action creating a constitutional impediment and does not toll limitations | Court: tolling fails as matter of law — no state‑created impediment, no constitutional violation (no right to effective counsel in postconviction), and no showing of prevention from filing earlier |
| Whether district court abused discretion denying amendment or motion to alter judgment | Amaya relied on civil pleading rules and Mata to justify amendment and timely relief | State argued postconviction rules differ from civil rules; amendment after dismissal is not contemplated; motion to alter was untimely under § 25‑1329 | Court: no abuse of discretion — postconviction practice does not permit amendment after court finds no hearing necessary; motion to alter was untimely and properly denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (federal courts may sua sponte consider timeliness of habeas petitions)
- State v. Crawford, 291 Neb. 362 (Neb. 2015) (statute of limitations for postconviction relief is an affirmative defense; not jurisdictional)
- State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288 (Neb. 2016) (application of § 29‑3001(4) to successive motions)
- State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29 (Neb. 2016) (postconviction statutes do not contemplate amending motion after court finds no evidentiary hearing necessary)
- State v. Hessler, 288 Neb. 670 (Neb. 2014) (successive postconviction relief permitted only for grounds not existing when first motion filed)
- State v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118 (Neb. 2015) (standards for reviewing sufficiency of postconviction pleadings)
- State v. Poindexter, 277 Neb. 936 (Neb. 2009) (appellate review of factual findings in postconviction proceedings)
