State v. Abigail Marie Stubbs
502 S.W.3d 218
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Abigail Stubbs was indicted under Tex. Penal Code § 33.07(a) (online impersonation) for allegedly using another’s persona on Craigslist without consent with intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten.
- § 33.07(a) makes it a third-degree felony to use another’s name or persona to create a web page or post/send messages on commercial social networking sites or other Internet websites.
- Stubbs filed a pretrial habeas application arguing § 33.07 is facially overbroad (First Amendment), unconstitutionally vague (due process), and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause; the trial court declared the entire statute unconstitutional and dismissed the indictment.
- The State appealed; the parties agreed Stubbs could only challenge subsection (a), so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to invalidate the whole statute.
- The court of appeals reviewed de novo and examined whether § 33.07(a) (1) implicates protected speech, (2) is content‑based or content‑neutral, (3) is overbroad or vague, and (4) impermissibly burdens interstate commerce.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stubbs) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 33.07(a) implicates the First Amendment and is content‑based | The statute criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech and is content‑based because enforcement requires examining message content (praise vs. criticism) | The statute targets conduct (use of another’s name/persona) and proscribes unprotected speech integral to criminal conduct (fraud, threats, intimidation) | § 33.07(a) implicates speech but is facially content‑neutral (not subject to strict scrutiny) |
| Facial overbreadth under the First Amendment | The statute reaches a substantial amount of protected speech (e.g., political criticism, reputational criticism) | The statute targets malicious, nonconsensual uses online (fraud, threats, intimidation); hypothetical protected applications are speculative and as‑applied challenges are appropriate | Not facially overbroad; challengers failed to show a realistic, substantial danger of unconstitutional applications relative to legitimate sweep |
| Void for vagueness (Due Process) | The statute’s use of the verb “harm” is overbroad and unclear, risking arbitrary enforcement and chilling speech | “Harm” is defined in the Penal Code; the statute’s other intent elements (defraud, intimidate, threaten) and lack‑of‑consent element narrow its reach | Not unconstitutionally vague; Penal Code definitions and contextual intent elements give fair warning and guidance |
| Dormant Commerce Clause (interstate internet regulation) | The statute unduly burdens interstate commerce by regulating conduct across the Internet | The statute advances a local, significant interest in preventing malicious nonconsensual impersonation online and regulates evenhandedly; effects on interstate commerce are incidental | Does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; incidental interstate effects do not outweigh local benefits |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (content‑based vs. conduct distinction; analysis of online solicitation and overbreadth)
- Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (facial overbreadth doctrine and pretrial habeas for facial challenges)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (content‑based regulation definition and strict scrutiny rule)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (content‑neutral time/place/manner review; narrowly tailored requirement)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (focus on statute’s plain text to determine scope vis‑à‑vis First Amendment)
- United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (limits on excluding categories of protected speech; fraud exception)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (content neutrality and examining communications to determine regulatory purpose)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (intermediate scrutiny for content‑neutral time/place/manner restrictions)
- Va. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats doctrine and unprotected threatening speech)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (overbreadth doctrine limitations where conduct, not pure speech, is regulated)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine: real and substantial danger required to invalidate a statute)