State v. A. Porter, 410 P.3d 955

In Aug. 2014 Michelle Allen arrived at work with bruises and a black eye; police were called and Officer Stovall drove her to the ER after she identified Aaron Porter as her attacker.
Dr. Tiffany Kuehl (ER physician and SANE medical director) examined Allen, found injuries consistent with strangulation, ordered CT angiography, and diagnosed strangulation, concussion, and other injuries.
Allen did not testify at trial despite a material-witness warrant. The State introduced photos, medical records, and Dr. Kuehl’s testimony recounting Allen’s statements made during the exam.
Porter objected on Confrontation Clause and hearsay (M. R. Evid. 803(4)) grounds; the district court admitted Dr. Kuehl’s testimony as non-testimonial and within the medical-diagnosis hearsay exception.
A jury convicted Porter of felony aggravated assault; he appealed arguing (1) the statements were testimonial and (2) Allen’s statements were not reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Porter)	Held
Were Allen’s statements to Dr. Kuehl testimonial (Confrontation Clause)?	Statements were nontestimonial because primary purpose was medical care and safety, not to create evidence for prosecution.	Statements were testimonial: police involvement, release form, and possible forensic purpose turned the exam into evidence-gathering for prosecution.	Nontestimonial; admission did not violate Confrontation Clause.
Were Allen’s statements admissible under M. R. Evid. 803(4) (medical-diagnosis hearsay exception)?	Yes—statements (attacker identity, description of strangulation, feelings of impending death) were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis, treatment, risk assessment, and discharge planning.	No—identity and subjective mental-state statements were not reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis/treatment and were forensic.	Admissible under 803(4); district court did not abuse discretion.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay excluded unless unavailable and prior opportunity for cross-examination)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (primary-purpose test distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial emergency statements)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (ongoing-emergency factor informs primary-purpose inquiry)
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (statements to non‑law‑enforcement for victim-welfare purposes are less likely testimonial)
State v. Whipple, 304 Mont. 118 (2001) (Montana application of medical-diagnosis hearsay exception and reliability rationale)
State v. Mizenko, 330 Mont. 299 (2006) (Montana discussion of Crawford and confrontation principles)