State v. A.M., 448 P.3d 35

Background

A.M., a juvenile, was stopped leaving a Goodwill with two other women; she had a backpack on which contained methamphetamine in a small outer pocket discovered during a search incident to arrest for theft.
After arrest and after invoking Miranda rights, A.M. was booked at the juvenile detention center and signed intake and release inventory forms that listed the backpack and included statements acknowledging accuracy/receipt.
The State charged A.M. with third-degree theft and possession of a controlled substance; at bench trial the court admitted the detention-center inventory form over defense objection.
A.M. testified she did not know about the drugs, that the backpack likely belonged to one of the other women, and raised the affirmative defense of unwitting possession (preponderance burden).
The trial court rejected unwitting-possession and convicted; the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review on a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim and a due process challenge to the burden-shifting nature of the unwitting-possession defense.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admitting the detention-center inventory form (signed statements that the backpack was A.M.'s) violated A.M.'s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination after she invoked Miranda	The intake signatures were compelled custodial statements reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses and thus inadmissible	The intake form was routine booking paperwork and any error was harmless; the trial court did not rely on the form	Admission was manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3); error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction reversed and remanded
Whether the unwitting-possession affirmative defense is an unconstitutional burden-shifting scheme that violates due process	A.M.: shifting the burden to the defendant to prove lack of knowledge violates the Fourteenth Amendment	State: under Cleppe/Bradshaw possession is strict liability and unwitting possession is a permissible affirmative defense	Court declined to reach this claim because it reversed on Fifth Amendment grounds (concurring opinion urged reconsideration of Cleppe/Bradshaw)

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings; invocation of rights protects against compelled statements)
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (U.S. 1977) (defining custody for Miranda purposes)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980) (defining interrogation as words or actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
State v. Juarez DeLeon, 185 Wn.2d 478 (Wash. 2016) (booking forms used at trial can violate the Fifth Amendment)
State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (Wash. 2009) (standard for manifest constitutional error review under RAP 2.5)
State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330 (Wash. 2002) (harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard for constitutional error)
State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373 (Wash. 1981) (held basic drug possession a strict-liability offense and recognized an unwitting-possession affirmative defense)
State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528 (Wash. 2004) (reaffirmed Cleppe's strict-liability reading and unwitting-possession defense)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1952) (presumption that mens rea is required for criminal liability)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (U.S. 1994) (mens rea presumption grows stronger as penalties increase)
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (U.S. 2019) (courts should read a mens rea requirement into silent statutes when appropriate)
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (U.S. 1957) (due-process limits on criminalizing passive or innocent conduct)
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (U.S. 1972) (invalidating ordinances that criminalize normally innocent behavior)