847 S.E.2d 125
W. Va.2020Background
- Jeremy S. was indicted on multiple counts (incest, third-degree sexual assault, sexual abuse) after his 14-year-old daughter reported repeated sexual abuse; police seized a blanket and sleeping bag from his home.
- State Police Lab testing later identified sperm DNA from Jeremy and DNA from the daughter on the blanket.
- The case was continued several times; the first scheduled trial in July 2014 was postponed to allow discovery and unavailable State witnesses.
- At the first trial (Nov. 2017) the jury initially returned not-guilty on nine submitted counts but two jurors gave qualified responses during polling; the court questioned them, declared a mistrial after a juror later indicated disagreement.
- At the second trial (Aug. 2018) a juror who had remote, past connections to the victim and prosecutor was retained after individual voir dire; Jeremy was convicted on nine counts and sentenced to an aggregate 16–40 years.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Jeremy's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury polling / alleged acquittal | Court may poll and, within discretion, ask limited neutral follow-up or make neutral clarifying statements to resolve ambiguity | Polling and court remarks manufactured a hung jury and effectively nullified an acquittal | Court affirmed: trial court acted within discretion; statements were neutral; no plain error (defense failed to preserve objection) |
| Continuance of first trial | Good cause existed (late discovery, unavailable State witnesses); delay was not intentional or oppressive | Continuance improperly spared State consequences of dilatory discovery and violated statute requiring trial that term | Court affirmed: continuance was proper remedy; delay not derelict and no substantial prejudice to Jeremy |
| Admissibility of DNA evidence | DNA on blanket was relevant; its weight (timing/nexus) was for the jury, not exclusion under Rule 403 | DNA was non-probative and prejudicial because it could reflect innocent household transfer, not nexus to crimes | Court affirmed: DNA met Rule 401 relevance; Rule 403 inapplicable; weight for jury to assess |
| Alleged biased juror at second trial | Juror's relationships were remote; juror asserted impartiality; trial court’s credibility finding entitled to deference | Juror knew the victim and prosecutor and held a past position of trust; should have been excused for cause | Court affirmed: no actual or presumptive bias shown; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying challenge for cause |
| Cumulative error | No single reversible errors were shown; therefore none accumulate to prejudice | Multiple errors cumulatively denied a fair trial | Court affirmed: doctrine applied sparingly; record shows no individual errors to cumulate |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tennant, 173 W. Va. 627, 319 S.E.2d 395 (1984) (permits limited, non-coercive follow-up when juror polling responses appear equivocal)
- State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (plain-error standard; burden on party challenging juror)
- State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) (circumstantial evidence and Rule 403 discussion; weight for jury)
- O’Dell v. Miller, 211 W. Va. 285, 565 S.E.2d 407 (2002) (actual juror bias shown by clear admission disqualifies juror)
- State v. McCartney, 228 W. Va. 315, 719 S.E.2d 785 (2011) (continuance not improper absent intentional delay or substantial prejudice)
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (origin of supplemental/dynamite charge encouraging deadlocked juries)
- Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (unanimous jury requirement under Sixth Amendment)