State Of Washington v. Terri Lynn Huizenga, 74713-4

Background

Terri Huizenga was convicted by a jury of felony harassment and third-degree assault after a physical altercation aboard her estranged husband’s moored boat; the jury acquitted or dismissed other charges.
Incident: Huizenga entered the boat, took photos, a struggle with Rachel Zima ensued, both fell into the water; Zima suffered a dislocated elbow and alleged Huizenga threatened to kill her.
At sentencing the State recommended a midrange standard sentence; Huizenga’s counsel requested a first-time offender waiver and Huizenga gave a voluntary allocution asserting she was the victim and denying responsibility.
The sentencing court explicitly invited allocution, then denied the first-time offender waiver, stating Huizenga had not acknowledged responsibility, and imposed a standard-range sentence: 6 months confinement + 12 months community custody.
Huizenga appealed, arguing the court’s denial of the waiver after her allocution violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; she also claimed ineffective assistance because counsel failed to argue that both convictions arose from the same criminal conduct.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denying a first-time offender waiver after listening to a defendant’s allocution violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination	Huizenga: denial penalized her for exercising the right to remain silent or for making defensive statements at allocution, amounting to compulsion	State/Court: allocution was voluntary (court told her she need not speak); Fifth Amendment prohibits compulsion, not voluntary statements; a defendant cannot volunteer testimony then later claim it was compelled	Court held no Fifth Amendment violation: allocution was voluntary and inviting allocution eliminated compulsion; court may consider allocution when exercising waiver discretion
Scope of factors a sentencing court may consider when deciding a first-time offender waiver	Huizenga: court should be limited to factors used for standard-range (criminal history and offense seriousness) and must not consider allocution	State/Court: RCW 9.94A.650 grants discretionary waiver power; legislature did not limit factors and allocution is a proper consideration	Court held the sentencing court may consider allocution and other factors in exercising discretion under the waiver statute
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that both convictions arose from the same criminal conduct (which can affect sentencing)	Huizenga: counsel failed to seek treatment of the two convictions as same criminal conduct, potentially altering the sentence	State: conceded error	Court accepted concession and remanded for counsel to make the argument at sentencing court; no directive on outcome was given
Whether appellate costs should be assessed	Huizenga: requested no appellate costs	State: conceded no appellate costs	Court accepted concession; no appellate costs assessed

Key Cases Cited

McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (voluntary statements vs. compulsion in corrections context)
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (Fifth Amendment protections apply at sentencing; fear of adverse consequences from post-conviction testimony)
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (psychological evaluation and self-incrimination at sentencing)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (Fifth Amendment privilege applied to states via Fourteenth Amendment)
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (voluntary testimony in a proceeding limits later assertion of privilege on same subject)
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (Fifth Amendment concerns compulsion)
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (advising witness of right to remain silent removes compulsion)
State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95 (state and federal self-incrimination protections coextensive)
State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474 (standard-range sentences generally not appealable absent procedural or constitutional error)
In re Personal Restraint of Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323 (historic and statutory recognition of right of allocution)