432 P.3d 1241
Wash. Ct. App.2019Background
- Trooper Acheson followed David Brown after observing a brief lane-encroachment while Brown turned onto Clearwater Avenue; no danger or other traffic resulted.
- Brown signaled and changed from the outer eastbound lane into the inner lane, then later signaled and moved into a dedicated left-turn lane; the vehicle’s self-canceling signal "cycled off" after entering the turn lane.
- Brown stopped in the dedicated left-turn lane, did not reactivate his left turn signal, and when the light changed, turned left onto Highway 395; Acheson then stopped him.
- Acheson cited the earlier lane-encroachment and later alleged failure to signal as grounds; the district court found no lawful basis for the stop, suppressed evidence, and dismissed the DUI charge.
- The superior court reversed, holding Brown violated RCW 46.61.305(2) (continuous signal for last 100 feet) by not signaling continuously before the turn; Brown sought discretionary review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 46.61.305(2) requires reactivation of a turn signal after entering a dedicated turn lane when the signal self-cancels before the turn | The statute and its structure require continuous signaling for the last 100 feet before a turn; "when required" is mere surplusage, so Brown must signal continuously before turning | Brown argued he had already indicated intent by signaling into and entering the dedicated turn lane, there was no safety risk, and continuous signaling was impossible or impracticable when the signal cycled off | Court held the statute requires signaling only when public safety is implicated; here no safety risk existed, so no continuous reactivation was required and the stop lacked constitutional basis |
| Whether an officer’s reasonable mistake of law supplies reasonable suspicion under the Washington Constitution | State cited Heien (U.S. Supreme Court) that reasonable legal mistakes can justify stops | Brown argued the Washington Constitution requires actual authority and does not permit reasonable mistakes of law to justify stops | Court held under Washington law an officer’s reasonable mistake of law does not establish reasonable suspicion; Heien is not controlling for state-constitutional analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (upheld suppression where officer trailed driver after purported unsignaled turns from turn lanes)
- Bowers v. State, 221 Ga. App. 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting similar statute: no signal required where lane change could be made with reasonable safety; stop unlawful)
- United States v. Garcia, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1250 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (held that a failure to signal a lane change under a UVC-based statute supported stop; read "when required" as surplusage)
- State v. Bea, 318 Or. 220 (Or. 1993) (discussed whether a turn requiring no deviation from course still qualifies as a signal-required ‘‘turn’’ under Oregon law)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. 2014) (U.S. Supreme Court: reasonable mistake of law can create reasonable suspicion under Fourth Amendment)