State Of Washington, Resp-cross App V. Christopher Krug, Appellant-cross Resp, 81586-5

Christopher Krug was tried three times on charges of possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and possession of drug paraphernalia; the third trial resulted in convictions for both offenses.
Deputy Michael Wilson arrested Krug on a misdemeanor warrant after spotting him in a vehicle at a coffee stand, asked about a short straw (a "tooter") before giving Miranda warnings, searched Krug, then read Miranda rights in the patrol car; Krug thereafter made statements about suspected methamphetamine and heroin.
Krug moved to suppress his statements under CrR 3.5 as obtained by an impermissible two-step interrogation; the trial court made an oral ruling admitting the statements and later—after appeal briefing—filed written findings and conclusions reflecting the oral ruling.
Krug appealed, challenging the delayed written findings, the admission of post‑Miranda statements as tainted by pre‑Miranda questioning, and seeking reversal of the controlled‑substance conviction under State v. Blake.
While the appeal was pending, the superior court vacated Krug’s controlled‑substance conviction under Blake; the Court of Appeals affirmed the paraphernalia conviction, held the delayed written findings were error but harmless, and upheld admission of the post‑Miranda statements.

Issue	Krug's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by not timely entering CrR 3.5 written findings	Failure to file findings timely violated CrR 3.5 and prejudiced review	Oral findings preserved the ruling; later written findings mirrored oral ruling and allowed appellate review	Court: Duty to file written findings—but delay was harmless because oral findings and later filings permitted review; no prejudice shown
Whether pre‑Miranda questioning about the straw created an impermissible two‑step interrogation tainting later statements	Pre‑Miranda question was designed to elicit incriminating responses and rendered post‑Miranda waiver ineffective	Pre‑Miranda exchange produced only exculpatory/small‑talk statements; post‑Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary; no deliberate two‑step to circumvent Miranda	Court: No two‑step violation—pre‑Miranda question elicited non‑inculpatory response, so post‑Miranda statements admissible
Whether controlled‑substance conviction must be reversed under State v. Blake	Statute invalid; conviction should be vacated	N/A (Blake decision controls)	Controlled‑substance conviction was vacated by the superior court during appeal; paraphernalia conviction affirmed

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (requires Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (two‑step interrogation can render post‑warning statements inadmissible when pre‑warning interrogation elicited the core confession)
Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (pre‑warning exculpatory statements do not necessarily trigger Seibert rule)
United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.) (framework for evaluating two‑step interrogation)
State v. Hickman, 157 Wn. App. 767 (applies two‑step inquiry in Washington; suppression where pre‑warning elicited confession)
State v. Rhoden, 189 Wn. App. 193 (analyzed effectiveness of Miranda warnings when suspect repeated incriminating information)
State v. Miller, 92 Wn. App. 693 (CrR 3.5 requires written findings and conclusions after suppression hearings)
State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170 (invalidated statute criminalizing simple possession; basis for vacatur of Krug’s controlled‑substance conviction)