State of Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of TX
918 F.3d 440
5th Cir.2019Background
- The Alabama‑Coushatta Tribe (the Tribe) and Texas have long disputed whether the Tribe may conduct gaming on its Restoration Act reservation; the Restoration Act (1987) restored the Tribe and expressly bars gaming that Texas law prohibits on the Tribe’s lands.
- IGRA (1988) created a federal regulatory regime for Indian gaming (Class I–III) administered by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC); IGRA does not expressly preempt state or other federal statutes.
- In Ysleta I, this Court held that the Pueblo’s Restoration Act and IGRA established different regimes and that the Restoration Act (a specific statute) governed over IGRA (a general statute), concluding IGRA did not displace the Restoration Act.
- The Tribe operated a casino in violation of Texas law; a district court permanently enjoined the Tribe’s gaming in 2002, and this court affirmed. The Tribe later sought NIGC approval to run Class II electronic bingo; the NIGC approved, finding IGRA applicable to the Tribe’s lands.
- Texas moved to enforce the permanent injunction and sought a declaration IGRA does not apply; the Tribe moved under Rule 60(b)(5) to dissolve the injunction based on changed law (NIGC decision, Brand X, City of Arlington). The district court denied relief, declined to afford Chevron deference to the NIGC, and the Tribe appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prior judicial construction (Ysleta I) bars agency (NIGC) interpretation under Brand X | Tribe: NIGC’s interpretation and intervening Supreme Court decisions supply a significant change; Brand X/Arlington allow deference to NIGC | Texas: Ysleta I is a binding judicial interpretation that unambiguously resolves the issue in favor of the Restoration Act | Ysleta I governed; NIGC’s contrary interpretation does not displace the court’s prior holding |
| Whether the Restoration Act or IGRA controls gaming on the Tribe’s lands | Tribe: IGRA’s structure permits Class II gaming and NIGC approval controls | Texas: Restoration Act’s explicit bar on gaming prohibited by Texas law controls; specific statute prevails over general IGRA | Restoration Act and Texas law govern tribal gaming; IGRA does not apply to the Tribe |
| Whether the district court abused discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(5) relief | Tribe: Changed legal landscape (NIGC letter, Brand X, City of Arlington) justifies dissolution of injunction | Texas: No intervening change undermining Ysleta I; prior precedent remains controlling | No abuse of discretion; denial of Rule 60(b)(5) affirmed |
| Whether Chevron deference applies to NIGC’s decision that IGRA covers the Tribe | Tribe: NIGC’s reasonable interpretation of IGRA merits deference | Texas: A controlling judicial precedent forecloses deference under Brand X; court should decide the statute’s meaning | Court declined to defer to NIGC; Brand X analysis favors the prior judicial interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir.) (holding Restoration Act governs over IGRA for the Pueblo)
- Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (prior judicial construction controls over agency interpretation only if the statute is unambiguous)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing two-step framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations)
- City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (addressing agency deference to interpretations of their jurisdictional statutes)
- California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (treatment of state regulation of gaming in the Indian context)
- United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012) (plurality on when prior judicial interpretation may foreclose agency interpretation)