State of Tennessee v. Willie Duncan, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 727

Background

In May 2012 a Shelby County grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Willie Duncan charging especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(b)).
Count 5 (the firearm count) tracked § 39-17-1324 and referenced the statute’s definition of “dangerous felony” but did not name which of the other indicted offenses (or any specific offense) was the predicate felony.
At trial the State presented proof that Duncan and co-defendants robbed victims at gunpoint and that Duncan shot one victim; the jury convicted on all counts.
On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals held the firearm count constitutionally defective for failing to designate the predicate felony and dismissed that count; the State appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
The Tennessee Supreme Court held the firearm count, read together with the other counts in the same indictment, provided constitutionally adequate notice and reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals; but because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that especially aggravated kidnapping with a deadly weapon could serve as the firearm predicate (contrary to § 39-17-1324(c)), the Court remanded for a new trial on the firearm charge only.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Duncan)	Held
Whether § 39-17-1324(b) indictment must name the predicate dangerous felony	Indictment need not name a predicate when multiple potential predicates are charged; reading counts together gives adequate notice	Failure to name the predicate deprived Duncan of constitutionally required notice; indictment omitted an essential element	The indictment was sufficient when read with the other counts; naming the specific predicate was not required here
Whether omission of predicate is equivalent to missing "essential element" rendering indictment void	The elements of the firearm offense were alleged (use of firearm; during a dangerous felony; mens rea); the specific predicate is an alternative means, not an element	The specific predicate is necessary for notice and thus an essential element for constitutional purposes	The court held the element requirement was satisfied; the notice issue governs and was met by reading counts together
Whether courts may look to trial evidence to determine which predicates are disqualified under § 39-17-1324(c)	State argued evidence would show the deadly weapon was a firearm, disqualifying kidnapping as predicate and leaving burglary as the viable predicate	Duncan argued the adequacy of the indictment must be judged at the time of indictment, not by later evidence	The court rejected reliance on trial evidence to cure notice defects; adequacy judged from indictment as filed, but here notice was adequate without needing trial evidence
Appropriate remedy where jury instruction allowed an impermissible predicate (kidnapping with deadly weapon)	Conceded error in jury instruction; requested remand for new trial on firearm count	Sought dismissal of firearm count for defective notice	Court remanded for a new trial on the firearm charge (did not dismiss), because the indictment was sufficient but the jury instruction was erroneous

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997) (adopts common-sense notice test for indictment sufficiency)
State v. Hammonds, 30 S.W.3d 294 (Tenn. 2000) (relaxes strict common-law pleading rules; indictment referencing statute can be sufficient)
State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2014) (defines elements and required mental state for § 39-17-1324 offenses)
Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. 2000) (statutory reference in indictment can satisfy pleading requirements)
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1962) (Sixth Amendment notice principles: indictment must contain elements and fairly inform defendant of charges)