State of Tennessee v. John Talley, E2016-00213-CCA-R3-CD

Background

John Talley pleaded guilty in 1985 to two counts of selling cocaine (two 4-year sentences) and in 1986 to three counts of selling cocaine (three 6-year sentences), with the 1986 sentences ordered to be served concurrently with each other and with the 1985 sentences according to his plea agreement.
In 2014 Talley filed a Rule 36.1 motion claiming the 1986 offenses were committed while he was on parole for the 1985 convictions, so Tennessee law and Rule 32 required consecutive sentences; he argued the imposed concurrent terms were therefore illegal and that his pleas were involuntary.
The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, finding (1) no illegality alleged for the 1985 judgments, (2) the record did not corroborate Talley’s claim that the 1986 judgments ordered concurrency, and (3) the 1986 sentences had expired, so relief was unavailable.
On Talley’s first appeal this court held he stated a colorable claim and remanded for the trial court to determine indigency, appoint counsel if needed, and hold a hearing unless waived (Talley I).
On remand, the State responded with attached judgment forms showing the 1986 judgments silent as to concurrency; the trial court, relying on intervening Tennessee Supreme Court rulings, again dismissed Talley’s Rule 36.1 motion.
This appeal raises whether Talley stated a colorable claim under Rule 36.1 given the silence of the judgments and the likelihood the sentences have expired, in light of controlling Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Talley)	Defendant's Argument (State / Trial Court)	Held
Whether Talley stated a colorable claim under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 that his 1986 sentences were illegally concurrent when consecutive sentences were required	The 1986 offenses occurred while on parole for the 1985 convictions, so Rule 32/Tenn. Code required consecutive terms; concurrent sentences thus illegal and pleas coerced	Judgments for the 1986 convictions are silent as to concurrency; Rule 32(c)(3) makes such sentences consecutive by operation of law, so the judgments are not facially illegal	No. The court held Talley failed to state a colorable claim because the judgments were silent and, by operation of law, ran consecutively rather than being illegal
Whether an expired illegal sentence is a cognizable claim under Rule 36.1	Talley argued a void sentence is void ab initio and thus has not expired	The State and trial court relied on State v. Brown holding Rule 36.1 does not authorize correction of expired illegal sentences	No. Under Brown and related cases, Rule 36.1 relief is unavailable for expired sentences; the motion may be dismissed if the alleged illegal sentence has expired
Whether the trial court was required to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on remand per this court’s prior mandate	Talley asserted the prior opinion required a hearing and appointment if indigent	The trial court declined based on intervening Supreme Court authority (Brown, Wooden) changing the law after remand, which allowed dismissal without a hearing	No error: court applied law-of-the-case exceptions because controlling law changed post-remand and dismissal was proper
Whether Talley’s claim that a sentence void ab initio never began (so it cannot have expired) entitles him to relief	Talley contended a void sentence never commenced and thus cannot be time-barred	The courts held Brown forecloses that argument; Rule 36.1 was not intended to reach expired sentences even if alleged void ab initio	No. The argument is foreclosed by Brown; expired sentences are not remedied under Rule 36.1

Key Cases Cited

State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015) (Rule 36.1 does not permit correction of expired illegal sentences)
State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015) (Rule 36.1 motions must state particular factual allegations; courts may consult the trial record to determine if a colorable claim is stated)
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011) (historical context that Rule 36.1 supplanted some relief previously sought via post-conviction/habeas corpus)
Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1998) (law-of-the-case doctrine and limited exceptions)