State of Tennessee v. George P. Watkins, III-Dissenting, W2015-02095-CCA-R3-CD

Defendant George P. Watkins III was convicted of (among other counts) possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.
At trial the jury instruction for the possession offense included the phrase that the defendant acted “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”
The majority concluded that including the generic mens rea (knowingly/recklessly) was plain error because the possession offense requires intent to go armed; Judge Holloway dissented.
Judge Holloway argues the instruction was not a clear breach of law because (a) Fayne construed the mens rea element but did not plainly eliminate application of the generic mens rea to other elements, and (b) Tennessee statutes allow different culpability for different elements.
Holloway views the possession offense as three elements: (1) possession (actus reus), (2) possession “with the intent to go armed” (specific mens rea), and (3) the circumstance that the possession occurred during a dangerous felony; he contends the third element is a circumstance to which the generic mens rea may apply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether instructing the jury that defendant acted “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” on the possession-with-intent offense was plain error	The State (majority) argued the possession offense requires intent for the mental-state element; including generic mens rea misstated elements and likely made conviction easier	Watkins argued the instruction misstated elements and lowered the State’s burden; Holloway argues it was not clearly erroneous because generic mens rea can apply to other elements/circumstances	Majority: plain error; Dissent (Holloway): no clear-and-unequivocal breach — would affirm convictions
Whether any instructional error requires reversal under the plain-error substantial-justice prong	Majority: erroneous instruction likely changed outcome, so relief warranted	Holloway: even if error, evidence uncontroverted that defendant intended to go armed (loaded gun under mattress near drugs); any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Majority reversed as to that count; Holloway would find error harmless and affirm

State v. Fayne, 451 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2014) (analyzed elements of possession-with-intent offense and how mens rea interacts with Burns lesser-included analysis)
State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014) (held generic mens rea may fill gaps for elements lacking a specific mental state and discussed jury-instruction structure and potential juror confusion)
State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999) (test for determining lesser-included offenses)
State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (recognized recklessness may apply to circumstances surrounding conduct)
State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (established plain-error framework referenced in subsequent decisions)
Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495 (Tenn. 1973) (noted intent often must be proven by circumstantial evidence)