State of Tennessee v. Ebony Robinson, 676 S.W.3d 580

On August 9, 2020, Ebony Robinson reversed her vehicle while on her phone, striking two children; one child died and the other was injured. Toxicology showed a .08 BAC and a psychoactive level of marijuana.
Robinson pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication (Class B felony), aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license; no plea agreement on sentence.
The trial court imposed a 10-year sentence (vehicular homicide) plus concurrent terms, and suspended most of the 10-year term to probation with immediate placement in a recovery program and periodic (one-week) confinement requirements over three years.
The State appealed the grant of probation, arguing a 2017 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303 made persons convicted under § 39-13-213(a)(2) ineligible for any probation.
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State, held that the 2017 amendment bars all forms of probation (including split and periodic confinement), and ordered execution of the sentence.
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review and affirmed: the plain language of § 40-35-303(a) prohibits any form of probation for vehicular homicide by intoxication convictions; the vehicular homicide statute’s cross-reference to § 40-35-303 makes the provisions reconcilable and no repeal by implication was necessary.

Issue	State's Argument	Robinson's Argument	Held
Whether the 2017 amendment to § 40-35-303 bars all forms of probation for convictions under § 39-13-213(a)(2) (vehicular homicide by intoxication).	§ 39-13-213 references release "pursuant to § 40-35-303," and § 40-35-303(a) expressly disqualifies those convicted under § 39-13-213 from probation, so no probation of any kind is allowed.	The 2017 amendment only precludes "full" probation; split confinement or periodic confinement remain available because the vehicular homicide statute only imposes a short mandatory minimum before possible probation.	The court held § 40-35-303(a) plainly bars any form of probation (including split and periodic confinement) for § 39-13-213 convictions; the statutes are read together and reconciled.
Whether the Court must treat the vehicular homicide statute as impliedly repealed by the later probation amendment.	No—because § 39-13-213 expressly makes release "pursuant to § 40-35-303," the statutes are harmonizable and no implied repeal is required.	(Argued indirectly) If § 40-35-303 is read to bar all probation, that would implicitly repeal the probation reference in § 39-13-213.	The court rejected repeal-by-implication; it read the cross-reference as subjecting § 39-13-213 to § 40-35-303 conditions, so no implied repeal was necessary.

Kampmeyer v. State, 639 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2022) (statutory-construction standard of review; questions of law reviewed de novo)
State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. 2018) (principles for statutory interpretation; ascertain legislative intent)
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010) (presumption that legislature knows prior enactments and judicial constructions)
Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857 (Tenn. 2016) (avoid constructions that lead to absurd results)
Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1995) (give effect to legislative intent when construing statutes)