State of Tennessee v. David A. Brimmer
E2017-00720-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Oct 23, 2017Background
- David A. Brimmer was convicted of first-degree murder in 1991 and originally sentenced to death; Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1994).
- After post-conviction proceedings and plea negotiations, Brimmer pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping; the State withdrew its death notice and Brimmer received a 60-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping (to be served at 100% as a violent offender) plus a consecutive life sentence for murder.
- Brimmer filed multiple collateral attacks (post-conviction, habeas corpus, and prior Rule 36.1 motions) challenging the voluntariness of his plea and the legality of the 60-year sentence; prior appeals rejected those challenges.
- In March 2017 Brimmer filed another Rule 36.1 motion, arguing the 60-year, 100% release-eligibility sentence under the 1989 Sentencing Act was more onerous than a life sentence with 25-year release eligibility under the 1982 Act and therefore illegal.
- The trial court summarily denied the Rule 36.1 motion as not stating a colorable claim; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding the sentence was authorized and not illegal and that release-eligibility/offender classification issues do not render a plea-based agreed sentence illegal.
Issues
| Issue | Brimmer's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 60-year aggravated-kidnapping sentence served at 100% is illegal because it is more onerous than a life sentence with 25-year release eligibility under the 1982 Act | The 100% release eligibility under the 1989 Act made the 60-year sentence more onerous than life with 25-year eligibility, so it is illegal | The sentence is authorized by the applicable statute(s) and Brimmer agreed to 100% eligibility; he failed to state a colorable Rule 36.1 claim | Denied — sentence is not illegal; Rule 36.1 claim is not colorable |
| Whether offender classification or release-eligibility terms agreed in a plea can render a sentence illegal | Such terms can make the sentence illegal if harsher | Offender classification and release eligibility are non-jurisdictional and may be bargained away in plea agreements | Denied — classification and release-eligibility are permissible plea bargaining terms and a knowing, voluntary plea waives such irregularities |
| Whether prior rulings foreclose the claim as previously litigated | The precise claim was not raised previously, but prior decisions addressed substantially similar arguments | The issue is either previously resolved or insufficiently distinct to state a new colorable claim | Affirmed — previous holdings and record show sentence authorized; claim fails |
| Whether the Rule 36.1 motion warranted a hearing and counsel | Brimmer argued the motion merited relief and therefore a hearing | The State argued the motion did not state a colorable claim, so no hearing required | Denied — no colorable claim alleged, so no entitlement to a hearing or appointment of counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1994) (direct appeal affirming conviction and death sentence)
- Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (post-conviction relief decision addressing penalty-phase counsel ineffectiveness)
- Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776 (Tenn. 2007) (offender classification and release eligibility are negotiable in plea bargaining)
- State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585 (Tenn. 2015) (defines "colorable claim" under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1 and distinguishes fatal illegal-sentence errors from appealable errors)
- State v. Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011) (discusses what constitutes an illegal sentence)
- Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997) (knowing, voluntary guilty plea waives irregularities such as offender classification or release eligibility)