State of Ohio v. United States
849 F.3d 313
6th Cir.2017Background
- Ohio and several political subdivisions and public universities paid approximately $6.1 million (2014 benefit year) into the ACA’s Transitional Reinsurance Program and sued HHS seeking refunds and a declaration that the Program does not apply to state employers.
- The Transitional Reinsurance Program (42 U.S.C. § 18061) requires "health insurance issuers" and "third party administrators on behalf of group health plans" to make per-enrollee contributions for 2014–2016; HHS administered Ohio’s program.
- The ACA adopts the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) definition of "group health plan," which in turn references ERISA’s definition of "employee welfare benefit plan," and ERISA recognizes "governmental plans."
- Ohio argued (1) the Program’s statutory definition does not plainly cover state-provided plans (invoking the plain-statement rule and ERISA textual limits), and (2) applying the Program to the State violates the Tenth Amendment through anti-commandeering and intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrines.
- The district court dismissed Ohio’s claims and denied Ohio summary judgment; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory definitions encompass state group health plans and that application to Ohio does not violate federalism principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "group health plan" under the Transitional Reinsurance Program includes state and local government plans | Ohio: statutory definitions and ERISA text do not plainly reach state plans; invoke plain-statement rule | U.S.: ACA adopts PHSA/ERISA definitions that plainly include governmental plans; cross-references suffice | Held: term includes state plans; cross-references to PHSA and ERISA show Congress intended inclusion |
| Whether the Program violates the Tenth Amendment via anti-commandeering | Ohio: requiring states to collect/pay is commandeering state sovereignty | U.S.: Program is a generally applicable regulatory obligation, not commandeering implementation of a federal program | Held: No commandeering; Congress may regulate state activities like private conduct (Garcia line) |
| Whether the Program violates intergovernmental tax immunity | Ohio: federal tax/charge on states infringes immunity and sovereignty | U.S.: immunity today protects only discriminatory taxation; Program is nondiscriminatory | Held: No violation; Program is nondiscriminatory and permissible under modern doctrine |
| Whether Ohio is entitled to refund or declaratory relief based on arbitrary or capricious agency interpretation | Ohio: HHS misinterpreted "group health plans" and applied rule unlawfully | U.S.: interpretation consistent with statutory cross-references and regulatory scheme | Held: APA challenge fails; statutory text and structure support HHS interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (context on ACA’s structure and nationwide coverage provisions)
- Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (permits Congress to regulate state employers like private employers under Commerce Clause)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (illustrates commandeering doctrine where federal law required state officers to execute federal tasks)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (commandeering precedent invalidating federal compulsion of state legislative action)
- New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (origin of intergovernmental tax-immunity concept)
- Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (discusses limits and political-process remedy for federal taxation of states)
- Mich. v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994) (applies plain-statement rule in tax context; discusses erosion of broad state tax immunity)
- Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (explains modern nondiscrimination focus of intergovernmental immunity doctrine)
- Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013) (noting that Congress need not use "magic words" and considering statutory context in ACA interpretation)
