STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. NICHOLAS MASCEÂ (16-01-0001, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-1967-16T1

Background

Defendant Masce pleaded guilty to third-degree theft by unlawful taking for diverting $85,131.18 deposited into his deceased mother’s account; victims included two pension funds and the Social Security Administration.
As part of the plea agreement, the State sought restitution in full, a probation payment schedule, and entry of a civil consent judgment in favor of the victims to secure recovery.
Judge Smith accepted the plea but refused to enter a civil consent judgment, expressing concern about statutory authority and ethical issues (citing RPC 3.4(g)).
The State moved for reconsideration, arguing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) permits courts to impose civil penalties at sentencing; the judge again ruled the Code does not authorize entry of civil consent judgments.
The State appealed the denial; the Appellate Division reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed Judge Smith, holding sentencing courts lack statutory authority to enter civil consent judgments as part of sentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a criminal sentencing court may enter a civil consent judgment for victim restitution as part of a plea/sentence	The Code (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d)) authorizes courts to impose civil penalties at sentencing; a civil consent judgment is a lawful civil penalty to secure victim remuneration beyond restitution	A civil consent judgment is contractual, not a sentencing "penalty," and the court lacks statutory authority to enter it	Court held sentencing courts lack statutory authority to enter civil consent judgments; restitution procedures in the Code and related statutes do not include docketing of civil consent judgments
Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(f) or 2C:43-2(d) authorizes entry of civil judgments at sentencing	2C:44-2(f) and 2C:43-2(d) permit civil remedies/penalties at sentencing; thus consent judgments are authorized	Those provisions preserve victims’ civil remedies but do not delegate authority to criminal courts to enter civil judgments; any civil penalties must be expressly conferred by statute	Court construed 2C:43-2(d) narrowly: it allows imposition of civil penalties expressly authorized by statute (e.g., license suspension, forfeiture of office), not consent judgments
Whether entry of a consent judgment would be consistent with the purposes of restitution	State: consent judgment secures full victim recovery and imposes an enforceable obligation	Defense/Judge: consent judgment would bypass court’s duty to assess ability to pay and undermine rehabilitative aims of restitution and payment schedules	Court held a docketed civil judgment for full loss would allow enforcement without regard to ability to pay, frustrating restitution’s rehabilitative purpose
Whether statutory default remedies authorize preemptive civil judgments	State: Chapter 43 allows courts broad remedial powers at sentencing	Defendant/Judge: statutory default remedies (post-default hearings, collection measures) allow enforcement actions only after default; no preemptive civil judgment authority	Court held remedies upon default are post-sentencing collection mechanisms; they do not authorize entry of a civil consent judgment at sentencing

Key Cases Cited

State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (discussing standard of review for statutory interpretation in sentencing matters)
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (statutory construction principle: read words in context and give generally accepted meanings)
Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251 (seek plain statutory language first; use extrinsic aids only if ambiguous)
State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586 (describing restitution’s dual purposes: justice for the victim and defendant rehabilitation)
State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242 (trial court lacked authority under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) to impose civil fines where statute created a civil enforcement mechanism)