State of New Jersey v. J.B.W., 434 N.J. Super. 550

Defendant J.B.W., a registered sex offender due to a juvenile adjudication involving a victim under 18, participated in a high school "Pit Crew" committee of a separate parents' association that supports the high school marching band.
The Pit Crew is a committee of a nongovernmental association (members pay dues) organized to promote and assist the school's band program and works in cooperation with school staff, including the band director and faculty advisors.
A grand jury indicted defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-23 for an excluded sex offender holding a position or participating in a "youth serving organization."
"Youth serving organization" is defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22 to mean sports teams, leagues, athletic associations, or "any other corporation, association or organization, excluding public and nonpublic schools, which provides recreational, educational, cultural, social, charitable or other activities or services to persons under 18 years of age."
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss; the Appellate Division reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and considered whether the school exclusion covers separate organizations that cooperate with schools.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a nongovernmental association that cooperates with a public school (Pit Crew) is a "youth serving organization" under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22/23	The statute's plain text covers associations (other than schools) that provide services to minors; the Pit Crew is an association, not the school, so the statute applies	The exclusion of "public and nonpublic schools" was intended to exempt organizations that work with or assist schools; affiliation with the school brings the Pit Crew within the exclusion	The court held the statutory definition unambiguously covers the Pit Crew; the school exclusion does not reach separate organizations that merely cooperate with schools; affirmed denial of dismissal
Whether the statute is ambiguous such that legislative history or rule of lenity should benefit defendant	The State: language is plain and gives fair warning; legislative history refers to volunteers of schools, not volunteers of separate organizations	Defendant: statutory language is ambiguous; should exclude organizations assisting schools; fair‑notice concerns favor narrowing the statute	The court found no ambiguity; legislative history supports the State's reading; fair‑warning concerns satisfied; resolved against defendant

State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (addressing de novo statutory interpretation in appellate review)
State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (discussing rule construing criminal statutes to give fair warning)
Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404 (statutory interpretation begins with plain language to discern legislative intent)
Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan–Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14 (use of legislative history when statutory language is susceptible to different meanings)
Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (courts avoid absurd results in statutory construction)