State of New Hampshire v. Seth Hinkley, 2019-0680

Background

In Dec. 2017, then-18-year-old Seth Hinkley was interviewed at the Berlin Police Department about allegations that he sexually assaulted a 17-year-old complainant; the 41-minute interview was recorded and Hinkley waived Miranda rights.
During questioning Officer Marsh corrected Hinkley’s apparent misunderstanding about age-of-consent law and twice told him he would not be “in trouble” if he admitted having sex with the complainant.
Immediately after those statements, Hinkley acknowledged he had intercourse with the complainant and made further oral and written incriminating statements.
Hinkley was charged with multiple counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and moved to suppress his confession and subsequent statements as involuntary under the New Hampshire Constitution.
The superior court found Marsh’s unqualified “not in trouble” comments amounted to a promise of immunity, that Hinkley relied on that promise in confessing, and suppressed the confession and later statements as fruit of the poisonous tree.
The State appealed; the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, applying state-law voluntariness standards and precedent requiring suppression when a promise of immunity or confidentiality is relied upon.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hinkley)	Held
Whether Marsh’s statements that Hinkley would not be “in trouble” were a promise of immunity	Statements were mere statements of law — that consensual sex with someone 16+ is not a crime, not a personal promise of immunity	Statements were unqualified, unequivocal promises that Hinkley would not be in trouble if he admitted sex	Court: Affirmed trial court; found statements were unqualified promises of immunity under Nat’l precedent and context did not undo plain language
Whether Hinkley’s confession was induced by Marsh’s statements (reliance)	The confession occurred later in the interview after confrontation with complainant’s allegations, not induced by the age-of-consent discussion	Confession came immediately after the officer’s “not in trouble” assurances and was made in reliance on that promise	Court: Affirmed trial court’s factual finding of reliance; confession was per se involuntary
Admissibility of subsequent oral/written statements (fruit of poisonous tree)	On appeal State did not meaningfully advance an alternative argument that later statements were independently voluntary	The later statements flowed from the involuntary confession and thus are derivative	Court: Suppression of subsequent statements affirmed as derivative evidence
Applicable voluntariness standard / scope of review	Context shows statements were factual explanations of law; appellate court should defer to that reasonable reading	Under NH Const. a promise of immunity/confidentiality renders a confession per se involuntary if relied upon; trial-court factual findings reviewed for manifest-weight error	Court: Applied New Hampshire precedents (Parker, McDermott); affirmed trial court’s factual findings as not against manifest weight

Key Cases Cited

State v. McDermott, 131 N.H. 495 (1989) (promise of immunity or confidentiality that is relied upon renders confession involuntary)
State v. Parker, 160 N.H. 203 (2010) (promises of immunity/confidentiality are categorically dispositive of voluntariness)
State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 (1994) (New Hampshire Constitution affords greater protection on voluntariness than federal standard)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warning and waiver framework)
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (under federal law the government must prove voluntariness by a preponderance)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (under federal law totality-of-circumstances governs voluntariness, including promises)
State v. Carrier, 173 N.H. 189 (2020) (voluntariness is a factual question; appellate review is for manifest-weight of evidence)