State of New Hampshire v. Miguel Francisco Perez, 239 A.3d 975

Background

Trooper Arteaga stopped a Colorado-registered rental Nissan Altima at night for following too closely and failing to signal; the car pulled over slowly.
At the passenger side he observed the defendant (Miguel Perez) shaking and nervous, a reclining female passenger who at first stared blankly, three cell phones in the car, and an odor of marijuana.
Records check confirmed the car was a rental; Arteaga learned Perez was on parole for murder and had no active warrants; passenger and driver gave inconsistent answers about their origin/destination.
Arteaga asked Perez to exit the vehicle, conducted a pat-frisk, obtained written consent to search after Perez volunteered consent, and found two bags of drugs in the car.
Perez moved to suppress; the Superior Court denied the motion, and after a stipulated-facts bench trial Perez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute (subsequent offense).
On appeal Perez argued the stop was unlawfully expanded (especially post‑decriminalization of small marijuana possession), rendering his consent tainted; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Perez's Argument	Held
1. Whether Arteaga had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the traffic stop (ask Perez to exit).	Totality of circumstances (odor of marijuana, three phones, rental car, slow stop, nervousness, parole status, inconsistent stories) supported suspicion of drug activity.	Odor-of-marijuana alone (post‑decriminalization) is innocuous; other facts were consistent with innocent travel and did not amount to reasonable suspicion.	Court held reasonable, articulable suspicion existed under the totality of circumstances; exit request lawful.
2. Whether the odor of marijuana remains a valid factor after decriminalization.	Odor remains relevant; it can indicate illegal activity (e.g., larger quantities, impairment) and may contribute to reasonable suspicion.	Decriminalization of small amounts means odor is largely innocent and cannot, by itself, justify an expanded stop.	Odor is still a relevant factor but not per se dispositive; it must be weighed in the totality of circumstances.
3. Whether Arteaga’s investigative choices (ordering exit before questioning source of odor) rendered the stop unreasonable or showed lack of diligence.	Officers need not ask specific questions first or exhaust all less intrusive measures; reasonable inferences by trained officers are entitled to deference.	Arteaga acted on a hunch and did not attempt to determine if the odor related to non‑criminal conduct, making the expansion a fishing expedition.	Court rejected a requirement that officers ask particular questions first; Arteaga’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.
4. Whether Perez’s consent to search was tainted by an unconstitutional detention and thus must be suppressed.	Because the exit and detention were lawful, the consent was not tainted and the search was valid.	Any expansion was unconstitutional, so subsequent consent was fruit of the illegal detention.	Because the stop expansion was lawful, consent was not tainted; suppression was properly denied.

Key Cases Cited

State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. 19 (2004) (explains reasonable, articulable suspicion and totality-of-circumstances test for investigative stops)
State v. Livingston, 153 N.H. 399 (2006) (odor of marijuana plus nervousness can support reasonable suspicion)
State v. Blesdell-Moore, 166 N.H. 183 (2014) (limits on scope and duration of investigative stops)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry-stop standard for investigative detentions)
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (permitting reliance on cumulative, individually innocuous factors to form reasonable suspicion)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (constitutional purpose of search-and-seizure protections)
State v. Sage, 170 N.H. 605 (2018) (scope of traffic stops must be tailored to their purpose)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (investigative methods should be the least intrusive reasonably available)
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) (Federal Constitution does not afford greater protection in comparable circumstances)