State of Missouri v. Daniel D. Hartman
2016 Mo. LEXIS 68
| Mo. | 2016Background
- On July 5, 2012, the victim was shot to death during a botched home robbery; three bullets were recovered from the scene.
- Hartman was charged with first‑degree murder, armed criminal action, and first‑degree burglary; co‑defendants testified pursuant to plea deals and one co‑defendant (Jonathan) invoked the Fifth.
- Defense sought to call Harlin King to testify that Jonathan spontaneously confessed to King shortly after the killing, admitting he shot the victim three times.
- The trial court excluded King’s testimony as hearsay; Hartman proceeded to verdict and was convicted (later the court entered convictions for second‑degree murder and armed criminal action and sentenced Hartman to concurrent life terms).
- On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, Hartman argued exclusion of King’s testimony violated his due process right to present potentially exculpatory evidence under the Chambers hearsay exception.
- The Missouri Supreme Court held the exclusion violated Hartman’s due process rights, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hartman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of out‑of‑court confession (Chambers exception) | King’s testimony was a spontaneous, reliable admission against Jonathan’s penal interest and thus admissible under Chambers; it could exonerate Hartman. | The statement was hearsay and inadmissible; allowing it was improper. | Court: Exclusion was error — King’s proffer met Chambers’ three indicia of reliability and could exonerate Hartman; testimony should have been admitted. |
| Prejudice from exclusion | Excluding reliable, potentially exculpatory testimony prejudiced Hartman’s right to a fair trial. | Any error was harmless because other testimony placed Jonathan among those who claimed to have shot the victim and the jury heard similar statements. | Court: Error was prejudicial; reasonable probability outcome affected; vacated convictions and remanded. |
| Applicability of accomplice-liability instructions if confession admitted | (Implicit) Admission of Jonathan’s confession would have allowed jury to credit alternate shooter and acquit Hartman of first‑degree murder. | Even if confession admitted, state could obtain accomplice liability instructions, so admission would not necessarily exonerate Hartman. | Court: Because King’s confession implicated Jonathan alone and matched corroborating facts, its exclusion deprived Hartman of a defense; admission could have led to acquittal on first‑degree murder. |
| Whether to reach closing‑argument claim on adverse inference | Hartman argued state urged jury to infer guilt from omission of excluded testimony. | State defended closing argument; trial rulings cured or made point moot. | Court: Did not decide adverse‑inference claim on appeal because it may not recur on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (constitutional due‑process hearsay exception for trustworthy out‑of‑court statements that exonerate the accused)
- State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1992) (discussing Chambers indicia of reliability)
- State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. banc 1981) (statements against interest that would exonerate the accused should not be excluded when reliable)
- State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013) (juvenile sentencing and related procedural treatment cited for sentencing posture)
- State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727 (Mo. banc 2012) (reversal for evidentiary error requires showing of prejudice)
- State v. Gilmore, 681 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. banc 1984) (error harmless where jury received the gist of excluded testimony)
- State v. Wells, 305 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. 1957) (exclusion not prejudicial when same or substantially similar evidence is otherwise admitted)
