493 S.W.3d 397
Mo.2016Background
- The Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund Board sued ConocoPhillips and Phillips 66 (collectively, Phillips) alleging improper reimbursement from the Fund; the Board and Phillips later reached a settlement approved by the trial court in a December 2014 final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
- Cory Wagoner, a potential future claimant against the Fund, moved to intervene as of right under Rule 52.12(a) and tendered a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied intervention in an interlocutory order entered November 2014.
- Wagoner did not pursue an immediate appeal from the November interlocutory order but timely appealed after the December final judgment approving the settlement.
- Respondents argued Wagoner’s appeal was improper because (1) he was not an aggrieved “party” under § 512.020 and (2) his notice of appeal should have identified the November interlocutory order under Rule 81.08(a).
- The Supreme Court of Missouri held Wagoner had a statutory right to appeal the December final judgment (which incorporated the interlocutory order), and that his notice of appeal properly identified the final judgment; the court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of intervention as of right because Wagoner failed to prove the elements required by Rule 52.12(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wagoner) | Defendant's Argument (Respondents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to immediate appeal of interlocutory denial of intervention | Denial of intervention is immediately appealable (Reser) | No statutory right to immediate appeal; §512.020 does not authorize it | Denial of intervention is not immediately appealable; Wagoner could appeal the December final judgment which incorporated the interlocutory order |
| Whether Wagoner could appeal from the final judgment he did not appear in | Wagoner contends final judgment incorporates interlocutory order so he may appeal | Respondents say Wagoner is not a “party” or “aggrieved” by the final judgment | Wagoner is a “party” for §512.020(5) purposes because the final judgment incorporated the interlocutory order; he was aggrieved and may appeal |
| Sufficiency of notice of appeal (Rule 81.08(a)) | Notice properly identified the final judgment as the appealable instrument | He should have identified the November interlocutory order | Identifying the final judgment was correct because it was the only judgment from which Wagoner had a statutory right to appeal |
| Denial of intervention as of right under Rule 52.12(a) | Wagoner argued he (as a potential future Fund claimant) has an interest and the Board might not adequately protect it | Respondents argued Wagoner lacked a direct, legally protectable interest and failed to show impairment or inadequate representation | Trial court did not err: Wagoner failed to establish (1) a legally protectable, direct interest, (2) impairment of that interest, and (3) inadequate representation by the Board |
Key Cases Cited
- Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. banc 2012) (standard for assessing appellate jurisdiction and procedural sufficiency of appeal)
- Farinella v. Croft, 922 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. banc 1996) (appeal is purely statutory; no appeal absent statutory authorization)
- Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. of America, 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962) (interlocutory orders may be premature for separate appeal)
- State ex rel. Reser v. Martin, 576 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1978) (writ inappropriate to compel granting intervention; denial of intervention reviewable on appeal)
- Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Dodson Intern. Parts, Inc., 155 S.W.3d 50 (Mo. banc 2005) (definition of who is aggrieved and when appellate review is permitted)
- Aherron v. St. John’s Mercy Medical Center, 713 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. banc 1986) (party aggrieved by parts of judgment may appeal final judgment disposing of all parties)
- State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122 (Mo. banc 2000) (elements required to intervene as of right under Rule 52.12(a))
- Johnson v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. banc 1994) (limitations on private enforcement where legislature provided enforcement scheme)
- Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 2665 v. City of Clayton, 320 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2003) (general rule that trustee, not beneficiary, holds right to sue third parties on behalf of a trust)