State of Missouri ex rel. Attorney General Chris Koster and the Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund Board of Directors v. ConocoPhillips Company and Phillips 66 Company, and Cory Wagoner
2016 Mo. LEXIS 209
| Mo. | 2016Background
- The Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund Board sued ConocoPhillips and Phillips 66 (collectively, Phillips) alleging improper reimbursement from the Fund; the Board and Phillips later reached a settlement approved by the trial court in a December 2014 final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.
- Cory Wagoner, a potential future claimant against the Fund, moved to intervene as of right under Rule 52.12(a) and tendered a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied intervention in an interlocutory order entered November 2014.
- Wagoner did not pursue an immediate appeal from the November interlocutory order but timely appealed after the December final judgment approving the settlement.
- Respondents argued Wagoner’s appeal was improper because (1) he was not an aggrieved “party” under § 512.020 and (2) his notice of appeal should have identified the November interlocutory order under Rule 81.08(a).
- The Supreme Court of Missouri held Wagoner had a statutory right to appeal the December final judgment (which incorporated the interlocutory order), and that his notice of appeal properly identified the final judgment; the court also affirmed the trial court’s denial of intervention as of right because Wagoner failed to prove the elements required by Rule 52.12(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wagoner) | Defendant's Argument (Respondents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to immediate appeal of interlocutory denial of intervention | Denial of intervention is immediately appealable (Reser) | No statutory right to immediate appeal; §512.020 does not authorize it | Denial of intervention is not immediately appealable; Wagoner could appeal the December final judgment which incorporated the interlocutory order |
| Whether Wagoner could appeal from the final judgment he did not appear in | Wagoner contends final judgment incorporates interlocutory order so he may appeal | Respondents say Wagoner is not a “party” or “aggrieved” by the final judgment | Wagoner is a “party” for §512.020(5) purposes because the final judgment incorporated the interlocutory order; he was aggrieved and may appeal |
| Sufficiency of notice of appeal (Rule 81.08(a)) | Notice properly identified the final judgment as the appealable instrument | He should have identified the November interlocutory order | Identifying the final judgment was correct because it was the only judgment from which Wagoner had a statutory right to appeal |
| Denial of intervention as of right under Rule 52.12(a) | Wagoner argued he (as a potential future Fund claimant) has an interest and the Board might not adequately protect it | Respondents argued Wagoner lacked a direct, legally protectable interest and failed to show impairment or inadequate representation | Trial court did not err: Wagoner failed to establish (1) a legally protectable, direct interest, (2) impairment of that interest, and (3) inadequate representation by the Board |
Key Cases Cited
- Ndegwa v. KSSO, LLC, 371 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. banc 2012) (standard for assessing appellate jurisdiction and procedural sufficiency of appeal)
- Farinella v. Croft, 922 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. banc 1996) (appeal is purely statutory; no appeal absent statutory authorization)
- Woods v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. of America, 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962) (interlocutory orders may be premature for separate appeal)
- State ex rel. Reser v. Martin, 576 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1978) (writ inappropriate to compel granting intervention; denial of intervention reviewable on appeal)
- Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Dodson Intern. Parts, Inc., 155 S.W.3d 50 (Mo. banc 2005) (definition of who is aggrieved and when appellate review is permitted)
- Aherron v. St. John’s Mercy Medical Center, 713 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. banc 1986) (party aggrieved by parts of judgment may appeal final judgment disposing of all parties)
- State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122 (Mo. banc 2000) (elements required to intervene as of right under Rule 52.12(a))
- Johnson v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. banc 1994) (limitations on private enforcement where legislature provided enforcement scheme)
- Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 2665 v. City of Clayton, 320 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2003) (general rule that trustee, not beneficiary, holds right to sue third parties on behalf of a trust)