Lead Opinion
Rеspondent landlords brought a rent and possession action against respondent Delicia Croft seeking “rent in the sum of $484.00 plus rent to date of judgment, restitution of the premises and costs.” Croft joined appellant Housing Authority of St. Louis County (“Housing Authority”) as third party defеndant. After trial before the circuit court, associate division, the court entered judgment in favor of landlords against Croft for $77.00 and against Housing Authority for $3311.00. Housing Authority appealed. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, ordered the case transferred tо this Court. Rule 83.02. We dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
If the petition for rent and possession claims damages not exceeding five thousand dollars, appellant’s sole recourse is a trial de novo under section 512.180.1. Christman,
Section 512.180 is silent as to the time at which the court ascertains the amount of damages claimed. To construe the statute adequately, we consider other statutes in pari materia, supposing the statutes are to be read consistently and harmoniously. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher,
The open-ended nature of rent and possession petitions does not preclude аll trials de novo, because section 535.110 provides, “[a]p-plieations for trials de novo and appeals shall be allowed and conducted in the manner provided in chapter 512 RSMo; ....” § 535.110, RSMo 1994. If all rent and possession petitions following the statutоry language were too open-ended to qualify for trial de novo regardless of the amount in controversy, the legislature would not have included trial de novo provisions in section 535.110. Furthermore, pleadings in the associate circuit division are to be informal absent the court’s discretion directing otherwise. § 517.031, RSMo 1994. Evaluating the petition to determine the amount of damages at the time of hearing harmonizes the related statutes on rent and possession, appeals from the associate circuit division, and procedure in the associate circuit division.
To demand an exact amount of damages not exceeding five thousand dollars on the face of the petition when filed before a right to trial de novo attaches is contrary not only to the current statutory scheme, but to the historical development of rent and possession and related statutes. Before 1978, rent and possession actions were filed in magistrate courts. § 535.020, RSMo 1969. Parties aggrieved by judgment rendered in a magis
With court reform in 1978, magistrate courts were abolished and duties of that court were assigned to associate circuit judges. These divisions are now usually referred to as assoсiate circuit divisions of the circuit courts. Associate circuit judges heard rent and possession actions because these cases could have been “heard and determined by a magistrate judge without assignment as an acting circuit judge under prоvisions of law in effect on January 1, 1979.” § 478.225.2(8), RSMo 1978. See § 535.020, RSMo 1978.
Accompanying the creation of associate circuit divisions, section 512.180 was divided into two subsections, the first describing the right to trial de novo:
1. Any person aggrieved by a judgment in a case tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge, other than an associate circuit judge sitting in the probate division or who has been assigned to hear the case on the record under procedures applicable before circuit judges, shall have the right of a trial de novo.
and the second setting forth when cases before an associate circuit judge shall be on the record with appeal to an appellate court:
2. In any case tried with a jury before an associate circuit judge оr on assignment under such procedures applicable before circuit judges....
§ 512.180, RSMo 1978. Rent and possession cases clearly fell under subsection 1 as types of cases not to be heard under procedures applicable before by сircuit judges and subject to appeal by trial de novo.
Section 512.180.1 was amended in 1984 to apply only to civil cases. § 512.180.1, RSMo Supp.1984. In 1985, associate circuit division jurisdictional limits were raised from five to fifteen thousand dollars. § 478.255, RSMo 1986. At this time, the phrase, “in all cаses where the petition claims damages not to exceed five thousand dollars” was added to section 512.180.1. § 512.180.1, RSMo 1986. Read together, the addition of the five thousand dollar limit to section 512.180.1 retained the right to trial de novo for cases traditionally heаrd in magistrate courts, later associate circuit divisions, and allowed appeal of cases traditionally brought before circuit courts. Reading into the five thousand dollar limit a bar to a whole class of cases traditionally served by trial de nоvo ignores legislative intent as gleaned from legislative history and the statutory scheme for rent and possession actions.
The Missouri Constitution underscores the concept of trial de novo as the default for review from associate circuit divisions acting within the traditional confines of magistrate court jurisdiction. Article V, section 27(5) provides:
The right to and method of review from a final judgment or appealable order of an associate circuit judge, or municipal judge, when so acting within the jurisdiction of cases heretofore within the jurisdiction of the former magistrate or municipal courts shall, until otherwise provided by law, be de novo before a circuit or another associate circuit judge within the circuit....
The law does provide othеrwise for cases with more than five thousand dollars in controversy, but the majority of rent and possession cases fall within the parameters of the traditional scheme.
“[P]roper appeal from a judgment entered by an associate circuit judge rests on the facts and not on labels.” Federated Mortgage & Investment Co. v. Jones,
Appeal dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The question in this case is whether appellants must seek a trial de novo or have the right to appellate review whеre an associate circuit judge enters judgment against them in an amount less than five thousand dollars where the original petition is open-ended in its claim for damages. Section 512.180.1, RSMo 1994, controls. That statute provides in relevant part:
Any person aggriеved by a judgment in a civil ease tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge ... shall have the right of a trial de novo in all cases where the petition claims damages not to exceed five thousand dollars.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority assumes that the amount of the judgment actually entered by an associate circuit judge determines whether appeal or trial de novo is available to an aggrieved party seeking to overturn the judgment. There is nothing in section 512.180.1 to support that assumption. Instead, thе statute says that the petition determines whether trial de novo or appellate review follows.
The majority’s reasoning and its willingness to read other statutes in pari materia depend on the premise that section 512.180 “is silent as to the time at which the court ascertains the amount of damages claimed.” (Op. at 756).
First, the statute is not silent. It says that the petition determines the amount claimed. It places on the party filing the pleadings an affirmative duty to state whether the amount of the claim exceeds five thousand dollars. By stating the jurisdictional amount in the negative, section 512.180.1 creates an exception to the general rule that “[i]f a recovery of money be demanded, no dollar amount or figure shall be included in the demand except to determine the proper jurisdictional authority....” § 509.050.1(2), RSMo 1994. Reading section 509.050.1(2) together with section 512.180.1, one must necessarily conclude that when a petition filed in the associate circuit division fails to state a dollar amount, the prayer anticipates the possibility that the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled exceeds five thousand dollars.
Second, the majority assumes that the claim must state an exact dollar amount and that such an amount is not accurately knowable at the time the landlord files the rent- and-possession action. I do not read section 512.180.1 to require such specificity. The statute requires only that the party seeking damages say whether the amount claimed is greater or less than five thousand dollars. By making that stаtement, the party seeking damages determines what sort of discovery is available prior to the hearing, whether the trial that follows will be on or off the record and the course an aggrieved party must pursue to set aside a judgment rendered against him or her. The statute is flexible. The first petition is not the plaintiffs final word; the rules permit amendment of petitions at any time a plaintiff finds the judicial process too slow to keep the amount due under five thousand dollars.
It makes great sense to me to establish the rules early in litigation, rather than wait until the last moment—the time of the hearing— to make a judgment as to what kind of ease is pending. I think that is what the legislature intended when it placed its emphasis on the time of pleading.
Given the state of the pleadings, I bеlieve the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, had
For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent.