State of Minnesota v. Michael David Franklin, 861 N.W.2d 67

Michael D. Franklin sold a controlled substance in 2012, pled guilty to fourth-degree controlled-substance offense, and faced sentencing in March 2013.
The State sought an aggravated upward durational departure under the career-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4, alleging Franklin had five prior felony convictions.
Franklin had five historical felony convictions (1990, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2006), but the 1990 felony possession conviction was converted to a misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) when his probation was discharged in 1994.
The district court found Franklin was a career offender and imposed a 66-month sentence (double upward departure).
The court of appeals reversed, holding the converted 1990 conviction could not be counted as a prior felony for § 609.1095, subd. 4, and remanded for resentencing. The State sought review.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding the relevant time to determine whether a defendant “has five or more prior felony convictions” is at sentencing; convictions converted to misdemeanors by § 609.13 before sentencing cannot be counted as prior felonies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Franklin)	Held
Whether a felony conviction converted to a misdemeanor under Minn. Stat. § 609.13 before sentencing counts as a "prior felony conviction" under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4.	Any felony conviction that occurred before the current sentencing qualifies as a prior felony; status conversion under § 609.13 should not exclude it.	The present-tense word "has" requires counting only convictions the defendant possesses as felonies at the time of sentencing; converted convictions are misdemeanors and cannot be counted.	The court held the statute is unambiguous: "has" is present tense (means "possesses") and the court must count only felony convictions the defendant has at sentencing; converted felonies do not count.

State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2014) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 2012) (read statute as a whole to effectuate legislative intent)
State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 2013) (apply plain meaning when statutory language is unambiguous)
State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 2009) (determine whether statutory language is ambiguous)
State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 2007) (statute ambiguous if subject to more than one reasonable interpretation)
State v. Anderson, 733 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 2007) (distinguishable statutory language in prior precedent)
In re Peace Officer License of Woollett, 540 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1995) (statutory-language comparison)
State v. Moon, 463 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1990) (interpretation of § 609.13 in context of a different statute)