State of Minnesota v. Lawrence Lee Hicks, A15-2028

Background

On Nov. 4, 2014, Lawrence Hicks stabbed Y.D. twice in the back after an altercation; Y.D. fell to the ground, was in a corner, and became permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Hicks also attempted to cut Y.D.’s hair (a culturally significant act) and fled without rendering aid.
State charged Hicks with first-degree assault—great bodily harm; state sought an upward durational departure to the 240‑month statutory maximum relying on multiple aggravating factors.
Hicks initially pleaded guilty and waived jury findings of aggravators, then withdrew the plea after receiving the PSI, later pleaded guilty again and admitted facts supporting aggravators including a prior felony in which the victim was injured, particular cruelty (attempt to cut hair), vulnerability, and flight.
The district court imposed a 228‑month sentence (67 months above the 161‑month presumptive), citing the statutory aggravator that both the current and a prior felony involved victim injury, plus particular cruelty and particular vulnerability.
On appeal Hicks argued the statute (Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(a)(3)) required the prior felony conviction to have victim injury as an element, not merely an incident of victim injury; he also challenged the court’s reliance on other aggravators.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hicks)	Held
Whether Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(a)(3) requires victim injury to be an element of the prior felony conviction	Statute permits departure when both current and prior felonies involved victim injury, regardless of whether injury was an element of the prior offense	Statute requires a prior conviction whose elements include victim injury, not merely a victim-injury incident connected to the prior conviction	Court held the statute does not require victim injury to be an element of the prior conviction; a prior felony conviction may be used if the victim was otherwise injured
Whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing an upward durational departure	The facts admitted/found supported at least one valid statutory aggravator (prior offense with victim injury), justifying departure up to statutory max	Departure was improper because prior conviction did not include victim-injury as an element	Court held no abuse of discretion; single aggravating factor sufficed to support the departure
Whether particular cruelty and particular vulnerability could support the departure	These factors were supported by admitted facts (attempted hair cutting; stabbing while victim was down and cornered)	Hicks challenged reliance on these aggravators	Court did not need to resolve these claims because the statutory aggravator alone justified the departure (but noted vulnerability was present)
Whether Blakely constraints were satisfied	State presented facts either admitted by Hicks or falling within prior-conviction exception	Hicks preserved Blakely objections earlier but admitted the relevant facts	Court treated the admissions as satisfying Blakely and relied on the prior-conviction exception where applicable

Key Cases Cited

State v. Misquadance, 644 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2002) (standard for substantial and compelling circumstances supporting departure)
State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2015) (review of district court departure discretion)
State v. Stanke, 764 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 2009) (requirement that facts underlying departure be admitted or found by a jury)
Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. App. 2010) (deference to district court on durational departures up to twice presumptive)
State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 2006) (deference framework for sentencing departures)
State v. Stauffacher, 380 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. App. 1986) (prior conviction with victim injury may justify departure even if injury was not an element)
State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1985) (prior violent crimes and continuity of violence can support departure)
State v. Meyers, 869 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2015) (interpreting what qualifies as a specified offense involving victim injury)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (requirements for jury findings or defendant admissions supporting upward departures)