State of Minnesota v. Krista Ann Muccio
2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 45
| Minn. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant Krista Muccio, an adult, sent sexually explicit images and engaged in sexually explicit direct-message conversations via Instagram with a person believed to be a 15‑year‑old; police charged her under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (felony communication with a minor) and § 617.247, subd. 4(a) (possession of pornographic work involving minors).
- Muccio moved to dismiss count one, arguing § 609.352, subd. 2a(2), is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment for overbreadth; the district court granted dismissal of count one and kept count two pending appeal.
- The State appealed the dismissal and argued the statute targets only unprotected speech (grooming/solicitation, obscenity, or child pornography) and, even if content‑based, survives strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored to protect children.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and found the statute reaches both protected and unprotected speech, is substantially overbroad, and is not readily subject to a narrowing construction.
- The court concluded the statute also fails strict scrutiny: although protecting children is a compelling interest, the statute is not narrowly tailored and thus is an unconstitutional content‑based restriction on speech.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Muccio's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) proscribes only unprotected speech | Statute targets unprotected categories: speech integral to criminal conduct (solicitation/grooming), obscenity, or analogous to child pornography | Statute reaches protected sexual expression because it covers communications that precede solicitation and non‑obscene material | The statute implicates protected speech; it is not limited to unprotected categories |
| Whether the statute is facially overbroad | Overbreadth is not substantial; intent element and prosecutorial discretion limit harm | Statute criminalizes a substantial amount of protected adult speech and chills expression | Statute is facially overbroad; it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech |
| Whether the statute can be narrowed by judicial construction | Court can adopt limiting constructions (e.g., require direct adult‑child communication or intent to arouse only the child/adult in conversation) | The statute is not readily susceptible to narrowing; judicial rewrite would be required | Cannot narrowly construe statute without rewriting; narrowing is not feasible |
| Whether the statute survives strict scrutiny as a content‑based regulation | Protecting minors from online grooming is a compelling interest and statute is narrowly tailored | The statute restricts significantly more speech than necessary; less restrictive alternatives exist | Although interest is compelling, statute is not narrowly tailored and fails strict scrutiny |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (content‑based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional)
- Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (indecent but nonobscene sexual expression is protected)
- Free Speech Coalition v. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234 (laws cannot be sustained based on a contingent, indirect causal connection between speech and harm)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (child pornography is unprotected because of harm to children in production)
- Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (three‑part obscenity test)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (offers to engage in illegal transactions and speech integral to criminal conduct are unprotected)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (courts should not uphold unconstitutional statutes based on prosecution promises to exercise restraint)
- Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (government may not prohibit speech that only increases chance of illegal act at some indefinite future time)