State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, II, 2015 Minn. LEXIS 473

Background

On Aug. 24, 2011, three teenagers were shot in north Minneapolis; Rayjon Gomez (13) was killed; two others wounded. Taylor was indicted for first‑degree murder and two counts of attempted first‑degree murder as the driver and alleged aider/abettor.
Two codefendants (Catchings and Copeland) pleaded guilty and testified against Taylor; a third eyewitness (T.B.) also testified; three jailhouse informants corroborated aspects of the State’s story.
State’s theory: Taylor drove YNT associates to look for a rival (Skitz) to retaliate; Catchings and Copeland exited and shot into an alley; Taylor allegedly encouraged secrecy and drove the group.
Trial evidence included accomplice testimony, jail calls by Taylor, a jail note seized from his cell, photographs of Taylor making gang signs, and a police gang expert who testified Taylor was gang‑affiliated.
Taylor raised eight issues on direct appeal (public‑trial/photo‑ID rule, exclusion of defense evidence re: alternate motive, gang‑expert testimony, accomplice instruction wording, lack of sua sponte limiting instruction on priors, speedy‑trial claim, attorney‑client privilege over jail note, admission of jail calls), plus cumulative‑error argument.

Issues

Issue	Taylor’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Photo‑ID requirement / public‑trial right	Requirement to show photo ID closed courtroom and violated Sixth Amendment public‑trial right	No evidence the rule was enforced or anyone was excluded; restriction was trivial	No closure shown; no constitutional violation; caution to courts about requiring ID without good cause
Exclusion of prior gang incidents (alternative‑motive evidence)	Exclusion violated right to present a defense and Confrontation Clause	Evidence of alternative motive otherwise admitted; excluded specifics were cumulative/confusing	Even assuming error, exclusion harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Admission of gang‑expert testimony	Gang expert should not have been allowed to testify Taylor was a gang member	Expert testimony was cumulative to photos, accomplice and informant testimony	Assuming error, admission harmless because testimony duplicated other evidence
Jury instruction on aiding and abetting (efficacy element)	Instruction omitted element that defendant’s presence must have actually aided the crime	Statute and precedent require knowledge and intent (to further crime); no separate efficacy element required	No error; court declines to add an efficacy element to accomplice liability
Expansive‑liability instruction (foreseeability phrasing / identifying intended crime)	Instruction omitted that foreseeability must be from defendant’s perspective and did not identify original intended crime	Record and closing made defendant’s perspective and intended crime clear	No plain error; instructions did not affect substantial rights
Use of Taylor’s prior convictions for impeachment without sua sponte limiting instruction	Failure to instruct jury to use priors only for credibility was plain error	Defense did not request instruction; trial contained other limiting and credibility instructions; impeachment usage was limited	No plain error; any omission was not prejudicial and did not affect substantial rights
Speedy‑trial (pro se)	Delay (1 year 4 months) and >100 days after demand violated speedy‑trial right; counsel ineffective for not moving to dismiss	Delays were for good cause (witness unavailability; conflict resolution), delay not manufactured by State, no prejudicial impairment to defense	Barker factors balanced against violation; no ineffective‑assistance showing
Attorney‑client privilege re: jail cell note	Note seized from cell was privileged communications with counsel	District court reviewed materials in camera and found note was not a communication seeking legal advice	Privilege not established; district court findings not clearly erroneous
Admission of jail calls	(arg unclear) calls prejudicial	Calls were relevant to consciousness of guilt and credibility (expressed desire to flee; possible false‑alibi)	No obvious prejudicial error on mere inspection
Cumulative error	Combined errors deprived Taylor of a fair trial	Errors, if any, were harmless individually and cumulative effect was minimal given strong evidence	No cumulative error; convictions affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (four‑part test for courtroom closure)
State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2012) (public‑trial analysis; triviality/locking doors)
State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 2001) (trivial closure standard)
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2007) (partial closure; accomplice‑presence analysis)
State v. Fageroos, 531 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1995) (closure during victim testimony; findings required)
State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2006) (use and limits of gang‑expert testimony)
State v. DeShay, 669 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2003) (expert testimony must add beyond jury experience)
State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 2004) (harmless‑error standard for excluded defense evidence)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Confrontation Clause harmless‑error framework)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (speedy‑trial prejudice and prosecutorial responsibility)