State of Minnesota v. Ge Her, 862 N.W.2d 692

Ge Her was convicted by a jury in 2008 of failing to register as a predatory offender after moving without notifying authorities.
An End-of-Confinement Review Committee (ECRC) of the Department of Corrections had previously designated Her as a risk-level-III offender before his 2003 release; Her never administratively challenged that designation.
At sentencing the district court imposed the presumptive prison term and, relying on the ECRC designation (via presentence materials), added a 10‑year conditional‑release term under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a.
Years later Her moved to correct his sentence, arguing that the Sixth Amendment required a jury (or admission) to establish the risk‑level fact that triggered the 10‑year conditional release; the district court and the court of appeals rejected his claim.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and held that imposing the 10‑year conditional‑release term based on a risk‑level finding not found by a jury (or admitted) violated the Sixth Amendment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the fact that the defendant was a risk‑level‑III offender must be admitted or found by a jury before imposing the 10‑year conditional‑release term	Her: risk‑level III is a fact that increased the sentence beyond the jury verdict and therefore must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted	State: statute authorizes the conditional term notwithstanding the statutory maximum; the risk‑level finding is like a prior conviction and falls within the prior‑conviction exception	Held: The risk‑level‑III finding is a fact that must be admitted or found by a jury; imposing the 10‑year conditional release without that violated the Sixth Amendment
Whether a DOC committee’s risk‑level assignment fits within the Sixth Amendment prior‑conviction exception	Her: risk‑level assignment is an administrative, qualitative assessment of future risk and is not the same as a prior conviction	State: risk level is sufficiently analogous to a prior conviction (verifiable by records) and thus falls within the exception	Held: The prior‑conviction exception does not extend to administrative risk‑level assessments; they require jury fact‑finding because they involve qualitative, non‑judicial determinations and lack the procedural safeguards of a prior conviction

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (sentence must be based on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by defendant)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be proved to a jury, subject to narrow prior‑conviction exception)
Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (prior‑conviction exception to jury‑finding rule)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (prior‑conviction exception does not permit judicial factfinding about the nature of a prior conviction beyond the conviction itself)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (sentencing courts limited to certain judicial records when determining the character of a prior conviction)
State v. Jones, 659 N.W.2d 748 (Minn.) (imposition of conditional release based on judge‑found facts violated Sixth Amendment)
State v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn.) (statute phrasing does not automatically shield enhanced penalties from jury‑finding requirements)
State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn.) (upward departures based on judge findings violate Sixth Amendment)
State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607 (Minn.) (distinguishing verifiable prior adjudications from qualitative findings)
State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40 (Minn.) (probationary status treated analogously to prior conviction for sentencing uses)
State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758 (Minn.) (court cannot make qualitative "pattern" determinations about prior convictions without violating Sixth Amendment)