State of Minnesota, ex rel. Anthony Alan Early v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections
A16-428
| Minn. Ct. App. | Oct 11, 2016Background
- Anthony Early pleaded guilty in 2002 to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (sentence allegedly expired) and in 2014 was convicted (via court trial on a stipulation) of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 42 months.
- DOC recommended enrollment in the prison sex-offender treatment program; Early refused in January 2015, was charged with a disciplinary violation, admitted the violation, waived a hearing, and received a 15-day extension of his release date.
- Early filed a habeas petition alleging the treatment requirement and the disciplinary sanction violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because his direct appeal of the firearm conviction was pending.
- The district court denied relief, reasoning Early neither claimed the privilege during disciplinary proceedings nor showed that treatment would compel incriminating disclosures about his pending firearm conviction.
- This court affirmed, holding Early failed to allege facts showing a substantial, real risk that treatment would elicit incriminating information about the firearm conviction and that he did not waive his Fifth Amendment claim by admitting the disciplinary violation.
Issues
| Issue | Early's Argument | Roy's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of Fifth Amendment claim | Early did not waive right despite admitting violation and waiving a hearing; he can raise habeas later | Roy: Early forfeited/waived by not asserting privilege at discipline and by admitting violation | Court: No waiver — coercion/administrative context means failure to assert at discipline does not bar habeas claim |
| Whether treatment would incriminate re: firearm conviction | Participation would require admissions that could be used against him on direct appeal of firearm conviction | Roy: Early failed to show any nexus; no reason sex-offender treatment would elicit firearm-related admissions | Court: Must plead facts showing a substantial, real risk; Early’s allegation was conclusory and inadequate |
| Habeas pleading/burden to make prima facie case | Early: conclusory allegation that treatment would force admissions suffices | Roy: petitioner must allege specific facts and evidence showing risk of incrimination | Court: Dismissed — petitioner must plead specific facts or evidence linking treatment to incriminating disclosures; conclusory claim insufficient |
| Request for categorical rule barring mandates while direct appeal pending | Early sought a rule prohibiting DOC from mandating treatment or punishing refusals whenever direct appeal pending | Roy: (opposed; argued case-specific analysis required) | Court: Declined to issue broad rule; habeas relief is fact-specific and not a vehicle for general injunctive relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 2007) (establishes "compulsion and incrimination" test for sex-offender treatment and Fifth Amendment claims in DOC context)
- Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (Fifth Amendment privilege applies in proceedings where answers might incriminate in future prosecutions)
- Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (general rule that privilege must be claimed when relied on, but recognizes exceptions where coercion or official compulsion make forfeiture involuntary)
- Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (discusses standard that risk of self-incrimination must be substantial and real, not speculative)
