210 A.3d 815
Me.2019Background
- On April 4–5, 2015 police investigated a reported burglary; the victim identified Kevin O’Donnell and Danielle Nelson as suspects and said firearms and other items were taken.
- Law enforcement obtained cell‑site location information (CSLI) from Verizon for O’Donnell’s and, according to the court, Nelson’s phones via an emergency disclosure request to locate the suspects; the pings placed the phones together in Lewiston near motels.
- Officers located O’Donnell and Nelson at a Lewiston motel, gained a key from the manager, forcibly entered, arrested both, and escorted Nelson to the Lisbon residence she and O’Donnell had been occupying.
- Nelson consented to officers’ entry at the Lisbon residence and helped them recover stolen property; O’Donnell later was indicted and moved to suppress the CSLI and all evidence derived from it.
- The motion court denied suppression; O’Donnell conditionally pleaded guilty to burglary, stealing drugs, and violation of release and appealed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | O’Donnell’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether acquisition of CSLI was a Fourth Amendment search | Carpenter requires suppression because CSLI was obtained without a warrant | Even if CSLI acquisition were a search, O’Donnell lacks standing to challenge CSLI obtained from Nelson’s phone, which produced the same locating evidence | Court declined to decide whether O’Donnell’s CSLI acquisition was a search because he lacked standing to challenge Nelson’s CSLI (which produced the operative evidence) |
| Whether EDLIA independently bars admission of location evidence | EDLIA’s warrant provisions (§650‑A) require suppression even if Fourth Amendment doesn’t | EDLIA does not confer broader standing than the Fourth Amendment; defendant cannot challenge third‑party CSLI absent ownership/use | Court held EDLIA does not give O’Donnell standing to challenge CSLI obtained from Nelson’s device; therefore EDLIA claim fails |
| Whether Nelson validly consented to entry and search of Lisbon residence | O’Donnell contends officers lacked objectively reasonable basis to believe Nelson had authority to consent | Officers had information (victim reports, officer’s prior knowledge of Nelson’s residence there, Nelson letting officers in and retrieving items) supporting an objectively reasonable belief | Court held officers reasonably believed Nelson had common authority and consented; entry and search lawful |
| Whether evidence found at motel and Lisbon residence is fruit of poisonous tree | Because CSLI was unlawfully obtained, all derivative evidence should be suppressed | Even assuming CSLI acquisition problematic, suppression not warranted because key evidence was obtained via Nelson’s valid consent and O’Donnell lacks standing to exclude third‑party CSLI | Court rejected fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree claim because O’Donnell lacked standing to challenge Nelson’s CSLI and police lawfully entered via consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (warrantless acquisition of historical CSLI implicates Fourth Amendment privacy concerns)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment standing requires defendant’s own reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (officer’s objectively reasonable belief in third party’s common authority can validate consent entry)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (third party with common authority may consent to search)
- State v. Sexton, 159 A.3d 335 (Me. 2017) (defendant lacked standing to challenge CSLI obtained for a nonparty’s phone)