115 A.3d 604
Me.2015Background
- Jonathan Collins pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor assault counts (after initial sexual-contact indictments were dismissed) and received consecutive suspended sentences with one year probation each.
- Probation initially barred contact with his stepson and allowed contact with his son only if supervised by a non-family third party or by agreement of family court and probation; Collins was ordered to undergo sex-offender evaluation and individualized treatment.
- A DOC blanket directive prevented probation officers from authorizing victim contact, making the original probation condition difficult to administer.
- Collins moved to modify probation to allow supervised contact consistent with a family court parenting order; at the modification hearing the court considered therapy reports showing denial of culpability and limited therapeutic progress and testimony that the child improved after contact ceased.
- The court denied Collins’s motion and ordered no contact with his son except as specifically permitted by the criminal court, finding supervised contact would risk psychological harm but leaving Collins the ability to seek future modification if he showed meaningful rehabilitative progress.
Issues
| Issue | Collins’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting contact absent court approval | Restriction was unsupported by evidence and conflicted with family-court supervised-contact order | Court properly relied on treatment records, DOC policy change, and statutory probation purposes to restrict contact for safety and rehabilitation | No abuse of discretion; prohibition supported by record and probation objectives |
| Whether the family-law parenting order bound the criminal court | Parenting order permitted supervised contact; thus criminal court should defer | Family-law order does not bind the State or criminal sentencing; different interests and standards apply | Family-court order not dispositive; criminal court may impose stricter probation conditions |
| Whether probation conditions may be more restrictive than terms related to parental rights | Criminal restrictions unconstitutionally infringed parental rights | Parental rights are fundamental but not absolute; protecting child safety and probation objectives can justify narrow restrictions | Restrictions were narrowly tailored to compelling state interest and constitutional limits satisfied |
| Whether the court exceeded statutory authority by modifying plea-produced probation terms | (argued in briefing) modification was improper if more restrictive than plea terms | Court may modify probation under 17-A M.R.S. §1202 when authorized and justified | Court acted within statutory authority; modification lawful and not beyond power |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Coreau, 651 A.2d 319 (Me. 1994) (probation may bar contact with children when needed for rehabilitation and public safety)
- State v. Telford, 993 A.2d 8 (Me. 2010) (standard of review and scope of court authority to modify probation)
- Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (parental rights are fundamental but can be narrowly restricted to protect child safety)
- State v. Spencer, 831 A.2d 419 (Me. 2003) (court may modify, add, or relieve probation conditions)
- United States v. Smith, 436 F.3d 307 (1st Cir. 2006) (conditions of supervised release can limit parental contact without rendering sentence invalid)
- Commonwealth v. LaPointe, 759 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 2001) (parental rights are not absolute and may be restricted by probation conditions)