104 A.3d 878
Me.2014Background
- Jessica Babb previously faced February 2012 charges for stealing drugs and theft; she entered a deferred disposition and was represented by counsel in that matter.
- In August–November 2012 police investigated a different alleged theft (jewelry and prescription medication) where Babb was a suspect; she voluntarily drove to the station and agreed to a polygraph on November 12, 2012.
- Before the polygraph the examiner told Babb she was free to leave, that she would not be arrested during the test, and that Miranda warnings were not required because she was not in custody; the examiner nevertheless gave a Miranda-style warning and said she could call an attorney; Babb did not request counsel.
- The examiner reported the polygraph indicated deception; Babb confessed to taking prescription medication, executed a written ‘‘voluntary statement’’ (which included Miranda language at the top), and later emailed additional incriminating statements.
- The State indicted Babb for stealing drugs in June 2013; Babb moved to suppress the polygraph statements arguing Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations and involuntariness. The suppression motion was denied and Babb entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the suppression issue on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Babb’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel from the prior prosecution barred police questioning about a later, separate alleged offense | Babb: right to counsel, once invoked for an offense, applies to interrogations about subsequently alleged offenses closely related; police questioned her without counsel present | State: Sixth Amendment is offense-specific; prior counsel for a different, unrelated prosecution does not bar questioning about a separate offense | Held: Sixth Amendment is offense-specific under Cobb/Blockburger; the 2012 and 2013 charges arose from different acts and required proof of different facts, so prior right to counsel did not attach to the later investigation |
| Whether the Sixth Amendment attached pre-charge because interrogation was a "critical stage" before formal charges were filed | Babb: pre-charge interrogation was functionally critical and thus entitled her to Sixth Amendment counsel | State: Sixth Amendment attaches only after adversary judicial proceedings commence; pre-charge questioning is outside Sixth Amendment scope | Held: Sixth Amendment did not apply because interrogation occurred before initiation of adversary judicial proceedings |
| Whether Miranda warnings or Fifth Amendment protections were required and whether waiver was voluntary | Babb: insufficient Miranda warnings and pressured circumstances made statements involuntary | State: interview was noncustodial; examiner gave warnings and opportunity to consult counsel; waiver was voluntary | Held: Miranda not required for noncustodial interview; warnings were given; confession and waiver were voluntary under totality of circumstances |
| Whether suppression court erred in denying motion to suppress | Babb: evidence gathered in violation of Sixth and Fifth Amendments and was involuntary; suppression required | State: no constitutional violation; suppression improper | Held: Court did not err; denial of suppression affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (Sixth Amendment is offense-specific; Miranda invocation differs)
- Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (use Blockburger same-elements test to determine offense identity for Sixth Amendment)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (same-elements test for separate offenses)
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (post-charge interrogation is a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes)
- Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (post-indictment interrogation and right to counsel at critical stages)
- Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (Sixth Amendment attaches at initiation of adversary judicial proceedings)
- State v. Drown, 937 A.2d 157 (review standard for suppression findings)