State of Maine v. Jeffrey P. Wyman
107 A.3d 641
| Me. | 2015Background
- Jeffrey P. Wyman was indicted for perjury based on testimony he gave at his January 2012 OUI trial; the State alleged he and his son fabricated a timeline (that he drank after going off the road) and then lied at the OUI trial.
- At the perjury trial the State introduced testimony from the arresting officer that, at the scene on April 20, 2011, Wyman said he had one beer at 8:30 a.m., which conflicted with Wyman’s OUI-trial testimony that he drank several beers after going off the road at 9:38 a.m.
- The officer testified (on cross) that he believed “lies were told” at the OUI trial; the court issued a curative instruction after defense objection.
- The State offered cell-phone billing records and called a Verizon custodian to explain the timing and “origination” columns; the court admitted the custodian’s lay explanation but barred technical location opinions.
- Defense objected that the State’s questioning and closing argument impermissibly commented on Wyman’s post-arrest silence, that the officer’s opinion usurped the jury, and that the Verizon witness offered expert testimony not disclosed per a discovery order.
- The jury convicted Wyman of perjury; the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Wyman's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether eliciting that Wyman did not report drinking after going off the road and referencing “what was said before/after” impermissibly commented on silence and violated rights | Improper comment on post-arrest silence and right to counsel/due process | The questions compared a pre-arrest inconsistent statement with trial testimony to impeach and prove perjury, not to penalize silence | Admission and closing reference were proper; no constitutional violation; no mistrial abuse of discretion |
| Whether officer’s testimony that “there were lies told” was improper opinion/usurped jury | Officer’s opinion was nonresponsive, prejudicial, and invaded jury’s role | Testimony was responsive to defense questioning and addressed officer’s bias; court’s curative instruction cured any prejudice | Admission not an abuse of discretion; curative instruction deemed sufficient |
| Whether Verizon custodian’s explanation of billing “timing” and “origination” required expert designation under discovery order | Custodian’s explanation was expert testimony (location inference) and should have been disclosed as expert | Witness gave lay, factual explanation of record columns, not technical location opinions | Court did not abuse discretion; custodian’s lay explanation admissible; expert testimony not elicited |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricci v. Delehanty, 719 A.2d 518 (Me. 1998) (trial court has broad discretion in controlling witness examination)
- McKenna, 707 A.2d 1309 (Me. 1998) (scope of witness examination reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Logan, 97 A.3d 121 (Me. 2014) (review standard for mistrial denial)
- Johnson, 472 A.2d 1367 (Me. 1984) (prosecutorial reference to defendant silence can require new trial in certain circumstances)
- Donnat, 311 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing inference from prior inconsistent statement versus silence)
- Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319 (Me. 1979) (in perjury cases, disparity between pretrial statements and trial testimony admissible)
- Dolloff, 58 A.3d 1032 (Me. 2012) (curative instructions presumed effective absent exceptional prejudice)
- Kirk, 873 A.2d 350 (Me. 2005) (standard of review for admission of disputed testimony)
- Nelson, 994 A.2d 808 (Me. 2010) (trial court discretion in admitting witnesses' testimony)
- Perez v. State, 980 So.2d 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (lay explanation of billing columns does not require expert qualification)
