Case Information
*1
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Reporter of Decisions
Decision:
Docket: Cum-13-486
Submitted
On Briefs: May 29, 2014
Decided: July 15, 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
CHAD A. LOGAN
SILVER, J.
[¶1] Chad A. Logan appeals from a judgment of conviction of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2013), unlawful sexual touching (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(C) (2013), and two counts of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2013), entered in the trial court ( Cole, J. ) after a jury trial. Logan argues that (1) the court erred in prohibiting Logan from eliciting testimony regarding sexual abuse that the victims’ mother experienced as a child, (2) the court abused its discretion in denying Logan’s motion for a mistrial after a portion of a police interview that the parties had agreed to redact was inadvertently played for the jury, (3) the court committed obvious error in failing to excuse or inquire further of a juror who worked for the same company as Logan, and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the record
supports the following facts.
See State v. Diana
,
[¶3] On December 25 or 26, 2012, while E.L. was on his lap, Logan touched E.L.’s back under her shirt, then moved his hands and touched her breasts under her shirt. Logan also touched her genitals over her clothing. While he was doing this, Logan said, “I love you so much,” and asked E.L. whether it felt good. At some point on December 25 or 26, 2012, Logan kissed both E.L. and C.L. on their mouths, with his top lip between each girl’s lips. These kisses were unlike kisses E.L. and C.L. received from other family members, and made them feel uncomfortable. Other family members did not see anything unusual occur between Logan and the girls, but there were times when Logan and the girls were alone in the living room.
[¶4] E.L. and C.L. returned to their mother’s house on the evening of December 26, 2012. Later that winter, E.L. would go to bed after school, cry at the dinner table, and then go back to bed. Eventually, in March 2013, E.L. and C.L. told their mother what had occurred at Christmas. The next day, E.L. was interviewed by police officers with her mother present. E.L. later participated in a forensic interview at Spurwink Clinic without her mother present.
[¶5] On June 7, 2013, Logan was indicted for unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), unlawful sexual touching (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 260(1)(C), and two counts of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A). A jury trial was held on September 10 and 12, 2013.
[¶6] At trial, Logan sought to elicit testimony from E.L. and C.L.’s mother about her own childhood experience with sexual abuse by her father. The State objected on relevance grounds. Logan argued that this evidence was necessary to show that the mother was hypersensitive about sexual abuse and that she raised the children in a manner that caused them to perceive innocuous contact as sexual. The court permitted Logan to question the mother generally about her “hypervigilan[ce]” with respect to her children, but did not permit inquiry into the mother’s childhood sexual abuse.
[¶7] The mother conceded that she was indeed more vigilant than most people concerning the people she allowed her children to be around, and testified that she did not allow E.L. and C.L. to have contact with her father. E.L. similarly testified that she was not allowed to see her maternal grandfather because “he hurts people, he has a problem.” Later, in an audio-recorded police interview played for the jury, Logan said that E.L.’s mother had been “molested” as a child and had previously accused Logan of inappropriately touching E.L. when E.L. was a toddler.
[¶8] The parties agreed that certain portions of Logan’s interview with the police would not be played for the jury, and that the prosecutor would turn the sound off at certain times during the recording. This included a portion of the interview in which one of the officers commented that E.L. and C.L. are “deemed to be credible . . . [and] have no reason to lie.” When the prosecutor turned the volume back up during this portion of the recording, the jury heard the words “reason to lie” or “no reason to lie,” apparently due to an error in the timing agreed upon by the parties.
[¶9] After the recording was played, Logan moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion, concluding that the words “no reason to lie,” standing alone, were not prejudicial, and that a curative instruction would be sufficient. [1] The parties agreed that the court would include in its final charge an instruction that the jury was to disregard witnesses’ opinions as to the credibility of evidence. The court ultimately gave the jury such an instruction.
[¶10] Logan was the last witness called by the defense. During his testimony, Logan stated that he works at Bath Iron Works. After Logan testified and both parties rested, the court stated on the record outside the jury’s presence that it had learned from the court officer that the jury foreperson also works at Bath Iron Works, did not recognize Logan, and said that “it wouldn’t have any effect upon the process.” The court questioned Logan, who said that he did not recognize the juror. The court found that this development did not “do[] anything to the process.” Logan did not request that the juror be excused, or that any further inquiry be made of the juror.
[¶11] The jury found Logan guilty on all counts. The court sentenced Logan on the unlawful sexual contact count to the Department of Corrections for a term of six years, all but thirty months suspended, with eight years of probation, and to lesser concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. Logan timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Cross-Examination of the Victims’ Mother
[¶12] Criminal defendants have the “right to conduct reasonable or
otherwise appropriate cross-examination to expose facts from which jurors could
appropriately draw inferences relating to a witness’s reliability.”
State v. Mills
,
[¶13] The court permitted Logan to elicit testimony that the victims’ mother
was more vigilant than most people in terms of the people she allowed her children
to be around, and that she did not allow her children to have contact with their
grandfather. The court also allowed Logan to elicit testimony suggesting that the
mother’s presence at police interviews had influenced the girls’ statements. The
court did not err in determining that the specific reason for the mother’s
“hypervigilan[ce]”—i.e., that she herself had been sexually abused—was not
relevant.
See
M.R. Evid. 401, 402;
Dolloff
,
B. Motion for a Mistrial
[¶14] “A motion for a mistrial should be denied except in the rare
circumstance that the trial is unable to continue with a fair result and only a new
trial will satisfy the interests of justice.”
State v. Poblete
, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 26,
993 A.2d 1104 (quoting
State v. Bridges
, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 11, 854 A.2d 855).
Because the trial court has a “superior vantage point,” we review the denial of a
motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.
Id.
We will overrule the denial of
a mistrial “only in the event of exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or
prosecutorial bad faith.”
Id.
(quoting
State v. Cochran
, 2000 ME 78, ¶ 28,
749 A.2d 1274). “[T]he trial court’s determination of whether exposure to
potentially prejudicial extraneous evidence would incurably taint the jury verdict
or whether a curative instruction would adequately protect against consideration of
the matter stands unless clearly erroneous.”
State v. Nelson
, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 6,
[¶15] There are no exceptionally prejudicial circumstances here because the
fragment of the police interview that the jury heard—“no reason to lie”—is not
highly prejudicial in and of itself. The jury did not hear the preceding portion of
the interview that made clear that the officer was referring to the victims’
credibility. The court instructed the jury to disregard any witnesses’ statements
about the credibility of the evidence, and made clear to the jury that it was the final
arbiter of credibility. There is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or bad
faith, and Logan does not claim any. The court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying Logan’s motion for a mistrial.
See Nelson
, 2010 ME 40, ¶ 6, 994 A.2d
808;
Poblete
,
C. Failure to Excuse the Jury Foreperson
[¶16] We review the court’s decision not to excuse the jury foreperson who
worked for the same company as Logan only for obvious error because Logan
failed to object.
See State v. Lovejoy
,
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶17] We will set aside a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence only if
no rational juror could have been convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
See State v. Robbins
,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. On the briefs:
Kevin G. Moynihan, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, Portland, for appellant Chad A. Logan
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, and Julia Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. Two, Portland, for appellee State of Maine Cumberland County Unified Criminal docket number CR-2013-2204
F OR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
Notes
[1] Logan renewed his motion for a mistrial at the close of the State’s case, at the close of all the evidence, and again after the jury rendered its verdict. The court denied the motion in each instance.