State of Maine v. Jahneiro Plummer, 243 A.3d 1184

Jahneiro Plummer was convicted by a jury of two counts of Class A aggravated trafficking (heroin and cocaine base) and one count of criminal forfeiture.
The quantities involved were well above statutory trafficking presumptive amounts; the court described the operation as large-scale and commercial.
At sentencing the court followed the three-step Hewey/17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C framework: set a basic term (step 1), consider aggravating/mitigating factors to set a maximum (step 2), then decide suspension (step 3).
The court set a basic sentence of 18 years based on the seriousness/scale of the trafficking, then found aggravating (commercial motive, out-of-community seller, lack of addiction) and mitigating (no prior record, family support, volunteer work, acceptance of verdict) factors and reduced the sentence to 15 years.
Plummer challenged his sentence on the ground that the court double counted the commercial nature/motive at both step one and step two.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding the court considered distinct aspects of the commercial facts at each step (scale at step one; personal motive at step two), so no impermissible double counting occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the sentencing court improperly double counted the commercial purpose of Plummer’s offenses by relying on it both when setting the basic sentence and when setting the maximum sentence under 17‑A M.R.S. § 1252‑C	The State: the court permissibly considered the commercial nature as an objective factor (scale/seriousness) at step one and Plummer’s personal commercial motive at step two—different purposes, no double counting	Plummer: the court relied on the same commercial-purpose rationale twice to enhance both the basic and maximum sentences, constituting improper double counting	Affirmed. No double counting—step one weighed the objective scale/seriousness of the crime; step two weighed Plummer’s personal motive (pecuniary/selfish gain); distinct considerations justified both references

State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151 (established the three‑step sentencing framework)
State v. Sweeney, 221 A.3d 130 (discusses applicable sentencing statutes and review)
State v. Hansen, 228 A.3d 1082 (sets out review standards for steps one–three)
State v. Lord, 208 A.3d 781 (same facts may be referenced in multiple sentencing steps if used for different purposes)
State v. Gray, 893 A.2d 611 (permitting reference to the same facts across steps when weighing different considerations)
United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221 (reviews double‑counting claims de novo)
United States v. Fiume, 708 F.3d 59 (same)
State v. Basu, 875 A.2d 686 (treats premeditation/pecuniary motive as a step‑one seriousness factor)
State v. Lilley, 624 A.2d 935 (considers offender‑specific circumstances, e.g., addiction, at step two)