191 A.3d 359
Me.2018Background
- Gregory Nisbet owned a Portland apartment building where a November 1, 2014 fire killed six people; most victims died of smoke inhalation and third-floor bedroom windows were too small to serve as secondary escapes.
- Nisbet was indicted on six counts of manslaughter and multiple counts for violating incorporated provisions of the NFPA Life Safety Code; after waiving a jury he was tried by the court.
- After a five-day bench trial the court acquitted Nisbet of manslaughter but convicted him of a Class E violation of Life Safety Code § 24.2.2.3.3 (egress window size/operability); sentence: 90 days imprisonment and $1,000 fine.
- Posttrial, Nisbet moved for a new trial asserting Brady nondisclosure of a 2013 State Fire Marshal policy memorandum that relaxed size requirements for pre‑1976 buildings (allowed 3.3 sq ft opening under certain conditions).
- The trial court found the memorandum was favorable and had been suppressed but not material because evidence showed the windows could not meet even the memorandum’s more lenient opening requirements; the court denied the Rule 33 motion.
- Nisbet appealed, arguing (1) vagueness of § 24.2.2.3.3, (2) Brady violation, and (3) insufficiency of the evidence. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Nisbet) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Vagueness of Life Safety Code § 24.2.2.3.3 (terms "clear opening" and "special effort") | The Code’s language is sufficiently definite (dictionary definitions and numeric measurements clarify terms) and must be construed in light of its life‑safety purpose. | § 24.2.2.3.3 is too vague for due process; terms like "special effort" and "clear opening" fail to give fair notice. | Court rejected vagueness challenge: ordinary meanings (Webster’s), numeric dimensions, and Code purpose provide adequate notice. |
| 2. Brady nondisclosure of 2013 Memorandum | Although the memorandum was favorable and not produced, it was not material because the windows could not meet even the memorandum’s relaxed 3.3 sq ft opening; no reasonable probability of a different outcome. | Suppression of the memorandum undermined confidence in the verdict; it would have altered defense strategy and possibly the verdict. | Court held no Brady violation as nondisclosure was not material; outcome not reasonably likely to have changed. |
| 3. Sufficiency of the evidence (application of Code and mens rea) | Evidence (measurements, occupant testimony, contractor warnings) established violation beyond a reasonable doubt and that Nisbet acted knowingly. | The State failed to prove § 24.2.2.3.3 applied (building pre‑1976) and contractor testimony was insufficient to prove Nisbet’s knowledge. | Court held evidence sufficient; even applying the 2013 memorandum the windows did not comply and the factfinder could credit contractor testimony to find knowledge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady materiality standard; "reasonable probability" test)
- Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 ("reasonable probability" undermining confidence in outcome)
- State v. Witham, 876 A.2d 40 (Maine standard on statutory notice and vagueness)
- State v. Falcone, 902 A.2d 141 (void‑for‑vagueness principles applied in Maine)
Judgment affirmed.