State of Maine v. Brian Nichols, 2013 ME 71

In May 2010, Brian Nichols murdered his wife Jane Tetreault with a rifle in their home; their son was in the home and heard events.
Nichols had a long history of domestic violence against Tetreault and previously exhibited escalating, erratic behavior and jealousy.
Prior to the murder, Nichols engaged in troubling conduct including asking his younger son about killing his mother and repairing a rifle.
Nichols pled guilty to murder under a plea agreement limiting the State to a maximum 42-year sentence; sentencing proceeded with memoranda from State and Nichols identifying comparable sentences.
The sentencing court determined a basic sentence of 35–40 years based on the offense’s nature and circumstances, including use of a firearm, premeditation, proximity to their son, and domestic violence context.
Nichols challenged the basic sentence and the court’s analysis; the court ultimately imposed a 40-year sentence after evaluating aggravating and mitigating factors in the second step.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the basic sentence misapplied for lack of precedent comparison?	Nichols asserts mandatory comparison to precedent in step one.	State contends comparisons are permissible but not mandatory.	No error; comparison to precedent is discretionary.
Did the court properly place Nichols’s conduct on a continuum of seriousness?	Nichols argues the court mislocated his conduct on the continuum.	State maintains the court correctly considered objective factors on the continuum.	Yes; proper consideration on the continuum supported the basic sentence.
Did the absence of data on others’ basic sentences implicate equal protection or due process?	Nichols claims lack of comparable data violates equal protection and due process.	State argues data limitations do not mandate vacating sentence and sentencing discretion remains.	No plain error; no constitutional violation shown.
May the fact that the crime was a domestic-violence context be considered at step one?	Nichols contends DV context should be reserved for step two.	State and court correctly treated DV context as an objective factor at step one.	Yes; DV context properly considered at step one.

State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30 (Me. 2010) (compare precedent is not required in step one; may aid equality)
State v. Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67 (Me. 2011) (comparing to similar offenses at step one; later clarified discretion)
State v. Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43 (Me. 2013) (affirmed discretion in considering comparable sentences)
State v. Basu, 2005 ME 74 (Me. 2005) (recognizes court may consider sentences of others for similar conduct)
State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165 (Me. 1997) (permits consideration of comparable sentences in setting basic sentence)
State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136 (Me. 2003) (affirms method of assessing offense conduct and related factors)
State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45 (Me. 2010) (guides consideration of factors in murder sentencing; proximity of child relevance)
State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990) (guidelines for placing murder on a continuum of seriousness)
State v. Holland, 2012 ME 2 (Me. 2012) (illustrates extreme seriousness in murder cases)
State v. Hamel, 2013 ME 16 (Me. 2013) (discusses sentencing factors and discretion in general)