State of Louisiana v. Sean Holloway
217 So. 3d 343
La.2016Background
- In 2007 Sean Holloway caused a fatal collision and, as a 19-year-old, registered BAC 0.051; he pleaded guilty and was sentenced in 2014.
- At the time of the offense (2007), La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1 required the trial court, when imposing sentence, to designate whether the crime was a "crime of violence."
- In 2012 the legislature repealed and replaced Art. 890.1 with a provision governing waiver of mandatory minimums that applies "upon conviction, in sentencing the offender," and removed the trial-court duty to designate crimes of violence.
- The State, after sentencing, moved to clarify the sentence and requested that the court designate Holloway’s conviction as a crime of violence under the former (2007) Art. 890.1.
- The district court initially declined to designate the offense; the court of appeal vacated that ruling but applied the 2007 Art. 890.1 (the court of appeal held the pre-2012 rule applied); the State sought review.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 2012 version of Art. 890.1 —which by its plain language applies "upon conviction, in sentencing the offender"—governs sentencing in 2014 and affirmed the court of appeal’s judgment vacating the district court’s post-sentence designation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Holloway) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which version of La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1 applies at sentencing when the offense occurred before but conviction/sentencing occurred after the 2012 replacement? | Apply the 2007 Art. 890.1 (in effect at time of offense); trial court may designate crime of violence. | Apply the 2012 Art. 890.1 (in effect at time of conviction/sentencing); no trial-court designation required. | The 2012 version governs because it applies "upon conviction, in sentencing the offender." |
| Does applying the 2012 Art. 890.1 violate the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clauses? | (Implicit) No violation; State sought designation under prior law. | Yes — retroactive legal changes that increase punishment are prohibited. | No violation: applying the 2012 article does not increase punishment and may be ameliorative, so ex post facto is not implicated. |
| Could Oliphant and subsequent jurisprudential changes operate retroactively to reclassify Holloway’s offense as a crime of violence? | State relied on Oliphant to justify designation. | Oliphant should not be applied retroactively to increase punishment or remove good-time eligibility. | The court agreed Oliphant should not automatically be applied retroactively to re-categorize offenses for ex post facto purposes; court of appeal was correct to reject automatic treatment. |
| Was the State’s post-execution motion to modify/clarify the sentence procedurally proper more than eight months after sentence execution began? | Sought correction/clarification and retroactive designation. | Defendant asserted the sentence was legal and final; late modification is not authorized. | The motion effectively sought modification of a legal sentence already in execution and should have been denied; the court of appeal’s vacatur of the district court’s ruling was correct on that basis as well. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Oliphant, 113 So.3d 165 (La. 2013) (addressed classification of certain offenses as crimes of violence)
- Massey v. Louisiana Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 149 So.3d 780 (La. 2014) (application of post‑conviction statutory restrictions on good‑time credits can violate ex post facto when it increases punishment)
- State v. Mayeux, 820 So.2d 526 (La. 2002) (ameliorative sentencing statute applying "upon conviction" may govern sentencing when enacted between offense and conviction)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1990) (ex post facto analysis: statutes that do not increase punishment do not violate the Clause)
- State v. Kondylis, 149 So.3d 1210 (La. 2014) (remanded to apply the 2012 Art. 890.1 procedures where conviction occurred after the amendment)
- State v. Sugasti, 820 So.2d 518 (La. 2002) (general principle that the law in effect at the time of the offense ordinarily dictates penalties, subject to exceptions)