180 So. 3d 1262
La.2015Background
- In 2004 the 3rd JDC district attorney filed a public "Omnibus Motion for Costs of Prosecution" seeking a minimum $100 prosecution cost for each misdemeanor; in 2006 the judges en banc authorized a $100 cost of investigation for misdemeanors.
- Jesse M. Griffin II pleaded guilty to first-offense DWI in 2012 and was sentenced to probation with conditions including a $600 fine and $100 each for costs of prosecution and costs of investigation; he paid those amounts but later moved to reconsider the sentence.
- Griffin argued La. C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and art. 895.1(B) permit recovery only of special or extraordinary, itemized costs actually incurred in a particular case, not routine/ordinary office operating expenses.
- The trial court denied Griffin’s motion, finding the $100 assessments reasonable and publicly noticed; the Second Circuit reversed, holding the statutes require case‑specific cost proof and do not permit recovery for ordinary operating expenses.
- The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review, held the statutes unambiguous, and reversed the court of appeal, reinstating the trial court’s judgment that such standardized, reasonable costs may be imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) permits recovery of non‑extraordinary, standardized prosecution costs | State: art. 887(A) makes convicted defendants liable for "all costs of the prosecution"; district courts may assess reasonable standardized costs. | Griffin: art. 887(A) allows only reimbursement for costs actually "incurred" in a particular case — special or extraordinary, itemized expenses. | Held: art. 887(A) is clear; it permits courts broad discretion to impose reasonable prosecution costs, not limited to extraordinary or itemized costs. |
| Whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permits standardized costs of investigation as a probation condition | State: art. 895.1(B) authorizes ordering "an amount of money" for costs incurred; trial courts may set reasonable, standardized amounts for probation conditions. | Griffin: art. 895.1(B) requires costs be tied dollar‑for‑dollar to expenses actually incurred in the specific investigation. | Held: art. 895.1(B) likewise allows imposition of reasonable standardized costs as a probation condition. |
| Whether the State must present itemized, case‑specific proof of each cost | State: itemization for every misdemeanor would be impractical; omnibus motion and public schedule suffice if costs are reasonable and notice is given. | Griffin: absent itemized proof, imposition of ordinary office expenses is improper. | Held: no requirement of dollar‑for‑dollar itemization in every case; public notice plus reasonableness and non‑excessiveness suffice. |
| Whether imposition of such costs violates due process/excessive sentence or creates a conflict requiring DA recusal | State: assessments are constitutional if reasonable, not excessive, and defendants receive notice; standardized collection does not create DA "personal interest." | Griffin: costs amount to payment for "doing their jobs" and could create personal interest/conflict for the DA. | Held: assessments are permissible when reasonable and noticed; collecting standardized costs does not alone create a disqualifying personal interest nor an excessive sentence in this record. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 720 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1998) (statutory interpretation principles; apply clear language as written)
- La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen Self‑Insurers Fund v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 17 So. 3d 350 (La. 2009) (use Civil Code maxims in statutory construction)
- State v. Parker, 436 So. 2d 495 (La. 1983) (upholding broad assessment of prosecution costs under art. 887)
- State v. Lopes, 805 So. 2d 124 (La. 2001) (defendant liable for costs inherent in adjudication of guilt; interpreter cost assessable)
- State v. Guzman, 769 So. 2d 1158 (La. 2000) (excessiveness standard for criminal penalties)
- Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1974) (statutory reimbursement schemes for defendant‑incurred state costs do not necessarily violate due process)